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Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places:
A Critique of the Academic Response
to the Florida Election
BY
KENNETH WARD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Let us attempt the impossible, to view the Florida election from a
fresh perspective. We do so, oddly enough, by ignoring Bush v. Gore
and the other cases that emerged from the election. Indeed, let us ignore
the issues litigated during the election controversy and the other ques-
tions that concern how the Court exercised its power or how people
should respond to its decision. Consider, instead, the barrage of scholar-
ship that addresses the election. While it is premature to form conclu-
sions on many of the issues that this scholarship has examined, we gain
important insights about the discipline of constitutional theory by con-
sidering how scholars have approached the controversy.
This article examines Bush v. Gore' to illustrate that the stakes of
important cases lead scholars to view the problem of judicial authority
from a perspective framed by adjudication. It contends that this legalis-
tic perspective obscures significant political phenomena at the periphery
of the immediate controversy, phenomena that should influence how
constitutional theorists think about judicial authority and its relationship
to law.'
We will see that scholars focus on how law affects the outcomes of
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southwest Texas State University. B.A., Drew
University, 1985; J.D., Yale University, 1988; Ph.D., Columbia University, 1998. 1 would like to
thank Howard Gillman, Kenneth Grasso, Paul Kens, Marc Ward, and Laylah Zurek for helpful
comments. I would also like to thank Bruce Ackerman for providing me an advance copy of his
collection, Bush v. Gore-The Question of Legitimacy. My research was advanced by a grant
from Southwest Texas State University as well as by much appreciated administrative assistance
from Coleen Hoffman. Lastly, I would like to thank my chair, Cynthia Opheim, for her constant
support and good cheer.
1. The article will also address issues implicated by the state cases. For ease of expression,
however, I will sometimes use Bush v. Gore to refer to the collection of cases. Given the purposes
of this article, it is not necessary to distinguish the separate cases because I do not examine the
doctrinal issues they raise. Moreover, it should be clear when I address arguments that pertain
exclusively to state or federal judges.
2. 1 emphasize that though I view law from a political perspective-an important implication
of the preceding sentences-my argument does not equate law and politics. See infra text
accompanying note 28.
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adjudication. They assess the legitimacy of judicial authority based on
the particular decisions that judges make. They ask whether judges
ground their decisions in legal principles or, alternatively, whether
judges interpret these principles to advance values that people should
embrace.' These scholars, then, associate judicial authority with a very
narrow idea of law. Law is relevant to the definition of judicial author-
ity to the extent that legal principles constrain judicial decisions or lead
judges to advance good values. While these aspects of law are obvi-
ously relevant to how we should define judicial authority, they are not
the only or, perhaps, even the most important ways that law might bear
on the definition.
This article looks beyond the immediate context of Bush v. Gore to
identify how law remains relevant to questions of judicial authority,
even if judges do not decide cases based on legal principles. Rather than
assess what the judges did, we will examine a broader question implied
3. Most scholars care about who won the case, why they won, the legitimacy of the victory,
and the consequences of the adjudication for future battles. Many constitutional theorists have
asked whether the Court's action can be justified as an interpretation of law, as an exercise of
political power, or whether the judges should have refused to decide the case. Others consider
how the holding should influence future appointments to the Supreme Court. We anticipate these
battles in terms of adjudication. Can the Court's equal protection holding be incorporated into
liberal strategies regarding voting rights? Should the Court or elected institutions resolve
analogous conflicts in the future? Or, how should the President and Senate exercise their powers
of appointment and confirmation over the judges who will adjudicate these future conflicts? See,
e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED: HOW THE COURT DECIDED THE 2000
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001); Guido Calabresi, hnpartial (But not Partisan) Praise of
Principle, in BUSH v. GORE: TrtE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 67 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002)
[hereinafter BUSH v. GOREj; Charles Fried, An Unreasonable Reaction to a Reasonable Decision,
in BUSH v. GORE, supra, at 8; Jed Rubenfeld, Not as Bad as Plessy, Worse, in BOSH v. GORE,
supra, at 21; Bradley W. Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism, and the Distrust of Politics, 62
01110 ST. L. REV. 1781 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive
Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in THE VOTE: BUSIH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 77
(2001) (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE VOTE]; Michael W.
McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, in The Vote, supra, at 98; Richard A.
Posner, Bush v. Gore: Prolegomenon to an Assessment, in THE VOTE, supra, at 165; Jack M.
Balkin, Legitimacy and the 2000 Election, in BUSH V. GORE, supra, at 210; Steven G. Calabresi, A
Political Question, in BUSH v. GORE, supra, at 129; Jeffrey Rosen, Political Questions and the
Hazards of Pragmatism, in BUSH v. GORE, supra, at 145; Margaret Jane Radin, Can the Rule of
Law Survive Bush v. Gore?, in BUSH v. GORE, supra, at 110. Bruce Ackerman, Off Balance, in
BUSH v. GORE, supra, at 192; Cass R. Sunstein, Does the Constitution Enact the Republican Party
Platform?, in BUSH v. GORE, supra, at 177; Richard A. Epstein, "n Such Manner as the
Legislature Thereof May Direct": The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE, supra,
at 13; ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE (2001); Richard Briffault, Bush v. Gore as an
Equal Protection Case, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 325 (2001); Richard Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the
Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377 (2001); Peter M. Shane,
Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for
Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 537 (2001); Richard H. Pildes, Judging "New Law"
in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 691 (2001); Lawrence H. Tribe, EROG v. HSUB and
its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170 (2001).
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by the fact of the case itself: why would people assign judges the author-
ity to interpret law? More particularly, the article identifies three values
that relate to this question: fairness, stability, and predictability. We
associate these values with the rule of law, an ideal that is more con-
cerned with the procedures people use to address social conflict than
with the outcomes of particular controversies. These values define a
priori considerations that should guide our choice of institutional proce-
dures. They are different from the values that judges advance through
particular decisions. I refer to these values as institutional virtues-or
more generally, virtues-in order to sharpen the distinction.
While we use values to assess the outcomes of particular controver-
sies, we use virtues to assess the institutional processes that settle such
controversies. These virtues should inform our definition of judicial
authority, but they do not bear on how judges decide particular cases.4
To grasp these virtues, therefore, we must see law as something more
than the legal principles that judges interpret to resolve cases. The elec-
tion cases illustrate how a narrow focus on legal principles leads schol-
ars to confuse these virtues and to ignore fundamental questions of
judicial authority that were implicated by those cases.
Note well that the article does not consider the particular legal prin-
ciples that grounded or might have grounded the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Bush v. Gore. Rather, it uses the case to illustrate that: (1) virtues
that animate the rule of law have a bearing on our thinking about the
definition of judicial authority whether or not legal principles constrain
judges; and (2) law has influence in the political community that is inde-
pendent of how judges decide cases. Moreover, this article does not
criticize or defend the Court's holding; nor does it directly address the
normative questions that must inform such positions. Instead, it exam-
4. Note that the distinction in terminology is only intended to mark the different levels at
which we apply values to resolve conflicts among citizens' interests. Although institutional
virtues relate to questions of process, they are substantive in the same way that values are. Indeed,
the same value can be applied at both levels. For example, I will contend that we should assess
judicial authority in light of the virtue of fairness, and we know that judges interpret the Due
Process Clause so as to advance the value of fairness. It is important to distinguish the terms,
however, because the question of who should decide cases is different from the question of how to
decide a particular case. In this article, I will identify arguments that relate to the virtue of
fairness that suggest why we would assign judges the authority to interpret law. Once we assign
judges this authority, some judges will no doubt make decisions that at least some people believe
offend the value of fairness. Although we assign judges authority for reasons that relate to
fairness, these reasons do not entail that judges will interpret legal principles in a way that
advances the best conception of fairness. Indeed, we will see that the reasons that we assign
judges this authority have little to do with the particular decisions we expect them to make.
Nonetheless, particular decisions-or more likely a pattern of decisions-might lead us to
reconsider the reasons that informed our definition of judicial authority. See infra text
accompanying notes 60-100.
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ines the case in order to illustrate that a focus on adjudication leads
scholars to ignore aspects of law that have significance for the definition
of judicial authority.
Section II steps outside the context of the election controversy to
consider why a focus on adjudication distorts our view of judicial
authority. It contends that scholars often focus on how to interpret the
Constitution to resolve particular controversies. These scholars, then,
are likely to ignore institutional virtues that have no bearing on such
controversies, even though these virtues might explain why we assign
judges authority to resolve such controversies. Section III links the aca-
demic response to the Florida controversy to the influence that legal
realism has had in constitutional theory and judicial politics. It contrasts
the legal realist focus on the outcome of cases with a broader perspective
of the role law plays within the political community. Section IV is the
article's core critique. It assesses the scholarly response to the election
controversy. Scholars focus on how judges decided the election cases
and how they might decide future cases. It is this focus that leads them
to ignore or confuse institutional virtues such as fairness, stability, and
predictability. Section V concludes by considering how a broader view
of law, one that encompasses institutional virtues, might shape how con-
stitutional theorists approach the problem of defining judicial authority.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS V. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
THE ADJUDICATIVE ARENA
Many theorists view the Constitution as a law that is to be applied
to resolve controversies, and view legal advocacy as a primary means
for determining its meaning.5 It is not surprising, then, that adjudication
frames the perspective of much work in constitutional theory. The
Supreme Court usually has the final word on how the Constitution will
be interpreted,6 and constitutional theorists hope to influence the Court's
exercise of this power. These theorists endeavor to move legal doctrine
closer towards their ideal conception of the Constitution. Thus, they
participate in constitutional politics. In so doing, they view constitu-
tional theory from the Supreme Court's perspective, from the perspec-
tive of adjudication, but it is a perspective that obscures important
theoretical considerations. To see why, we must consider constitutional
politics more closely.
5. John E. Finn, The Civic Constitution: Sone Prelinlinaries, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS:
ESSAYS ON CONSTIruTION MAKING, MAINTINANCE, AND CHANGI 41 (Sotirios A. Barber & Robert
George eds., 2001); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword to The Supremte Court 2000 Term: We the Court,
115 HARv. L. Riv. 4 (2001).
6. See JEFIRIY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATITUDINAL
MODEL 71-72 (1993).
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Constitutional politics is a strange game. Citizens debate the mean-
ing of the Constitution while using it to regulate their pursuit of a wide
variety of interrelated interests. They seek resources and conditions that
make life bearable, enjoyable, interesting, or satisfying. Constitutional
law establishes institutions that regulate citizens' pursuit of these inter-
ests. It also expresses values to guide institutions as they exercise their
authority, such as the values of liberty and equality we advance through
the Fourteenth Amendment. These values often define conditions that
greatly affect the lives citizens can live. We use constitutional law, then,
to advance conceptions of how people should live or, less strongly, con-
ceptions of the political environment in which people should choose
their own course of life. It is our disagreements about these conceptions
that give constitutional politics its unique character. Because citizens
disagree about competing constitutional values, one object of the consti-
tutional politics game is to determine the game that is being played.
Many have noted that constitutional politics has this dual charac-
ter,' and we can see that this character has had important ramifications
for the agenda of constitutional theory. Theorists have argued about
how to resolve political conflicts given the values that underlie specific
constitutional provisions and the broader constitutional structure. Others
have paid less attention to how judges should decide particular contro-
versies and have given greater emphasis to how judges should exercise
their power, what types of cases they should decide, and how they
should justify their holdings. Still others have questioned whether
judges should continue to play the prominent role in resolving conflicts
about the Constitution's meaning.8
7. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Mark Tushnet, Tile
Conservatism in Bush v. Gore, in BUSH v. GORE, supra note 3.
8. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539
(1988); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP,
VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1991); TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN
DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999); MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1999); SorIRios A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984); Gerald F. Gaus, Public Reason and the Rule of Lou', in THE RULE
OF LAW (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT (2001); RICHARD FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001); LOUIS
MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2000); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); ROBERT BORK,
SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 96-119 (1996);
MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING TIE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM TIlE COURTS (1999); JEREMY
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
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It is more difficult, however, to grasp the extent that constitutional
politics-and in particular the adjudicative arena in which its battles are
fought-shapes the perspective of constitutional theorists.9  Most-if
not all-of the work mentioned above directly comments on Supreme
Court holdings or future holdings, or addresses structural issues of con-
stitutional law with an eye toward influencing substantive doctrine.' 0
Therefore, theorists focus on the relationship between constitutional
values and case outcomes. For example, most theorists recognize that
our interest in particular cases might shape our view of the constitutional
values that are at issue in those cases.'' Indeed, many have commented
on the relationship between people's party identification and the consti-
tutional values that those people believe should have guided the decision
in Bush v. Gore. 2 But theorists pay less attention to the broader politi-
cal context in which adjudication is situated. They do not adequately
consider adjudication-or constitutional politics-in light of institu-
tional virtues that are independent of the cases that judges might decide,
virtues such as fairness, " stability, and predictability.
There are exceptions. Some theorists have linked questions of judi-
cial authority to virtues that are not implicated in particular constitu-
tional controversies. Consider Jeremy Waldron's recent defense of
legislation as an alternative to judicial review. 4 He argues that we
empower these institutions to resolve conflicts about the meaning of val-
ues, and that we should choose an institutional structure based on con-
siderations that do not assume an answer to such conflicts.
Waldron's argument turns on a distinction between the process that
we-a collective-should use to settle our disagreements about values
9. While some have commented on the tendency of constitutional theorists to focus on the
Court as the sole source of constitutional law and others have questioned the priority people assign
the Court's interpretation of the Constitution, we have paid much less attention to the
consequences, for constitutional theory, of viewing constitutional theory problems in terms of the
doctrinal questions that political institutions-whether courts, executives, or legislators-must
answer. Scholars who work from a comparative perspective are less prone to this mistake. Mary
Anne Glendon, for example, has provided great insight on how the language of law shapes our
view of how political controversies should be resolved. See MARY ANNE GLENDON, RIGHTS
TALK: TIlE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991). She is more concerned by the
effects that follow from how political institutions resolve controversies than by the substantive
outcomes of particular controversies.
10. Cf Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Roles of LUw Professors il the Wake of
Bush v. Gore, 90 GFeo. L.J. 173 (2001). Balkin and Levinson discuss the role that law professors
should play in doctrinal argument. They examine whether law professors should view doctrinal
debates from an internal or external perspective, but their focus remains on doctrinal outcomes.
1I. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to THE VOTE, supra note 3, at 5.
12. See id.; see also Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional
HistorY, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721 (2001): GILLMAN, supra note 3, at 189.
13. 1 am using fairness as a virtue and not as a value. See supra note 4.
14. See WALDRON, supra note 8.
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and the particular values that I-an individual-believe should guide the
Court or other institution that resolves these disagreements. Constitu-
tional theorists, according to Waldron, should concentrate on the ques-
tion of how to respond procedurally to disagreements about values, as
opposed to the question of which is the best of the disputed values. He
claims that legislation, in contrast to judicial review, settles citizens' dis-
agreements about values without assuming answers to the questions that
are in dispute. Thus, equality is an institutional virtue of the legislative
process; such a process treats each citizen as an equal member of the
political community no matter what values they hold. 5
Waldron's point is significant in that he assesses judicial authority
in terms of virtues that are independent of the controversies that courts
or other political institutions must resolve.' 6 More significantly, it is
easy to misread Waldron's argument because he does not focus on the
values that judges might apply in deciding particular cases. Rather, he
views law as a political institution that citizens use to define a procedure
to address the controversies they must resolve.' 7
While Waldron is not alone in viewing law and judicial authority
from a broader political perspective, his approach is atypical.'" I have
argued elsewhere that American constitutional theorists have trouble
grasping arguments like Waldron's because these arguments consider
law from outside the context of adjudication. In this article, I consider
why it is so difficult for many American constitutional theorists to see
law from this perspective. In examining the scholarship that responds to
the Florida election controversy, it is easy to identify the influence of the
narrower perspective. But we must also consider how much it misses.
The next section links the scholarship on the Florida election to a
perspective associated with legal realism, a perspective that dominates
the fields of constitutional theory and judicial politics. It also sharpens
the contrast between this perspective and a broader view, such as the one
that informs Waldron's argument. Section IV then examines how the
15. See id. at 3, 6-7.
16. 1 remain agnostic on Waldron's conclusions about judicial review; in a separate essay, I
question whether Waldron adequately considers the possibility that judicial review might be
consistent with institutional virtues that are independent of the considerations of justice that are
implicated by particular controversies. (On file with author.) In that essay, I also point out that it
is difficult to grasp Waldron's argument because it transcends the context of adjudication. I
contrast Waldron's approach with John Hart Ely's defense of judicial review in Democracy and
Distrust. While Waldron's proceduralist conception bears a superficial resemblance to Ely's, they
are distinguished by the fact that Waldron's argument depends on political virtues that can be
advanced independent of the context of adjudication. Ely's procedural conception of democracy
presupposes the answer to substantive questions of justice that are implicated by the cases that
judges must decide.
17. See WALDRON, supra note 8, at 3, 6-7.
18. See also infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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narrower perspective of law distorts our view of the election cases. It
identifies fundamental questions of judicial authority that underlie the
controversy, questions that have been absent from much of the scholarly
commentary. In addition, it suggests that important answers to these
questions are informed by virtues associated with the rule of law, fair-
ness, stability, and predictability.
III. LEGAL REALISM AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
A. Legal Realism and its Consequences: Law is Political v.
Law is Politics
As a new law student, I discovered that we are all legal realists1 9
now.2" Though I was never sure what this meant, I soon learned that
legal realism challenged the notion of law as an autonomous apolitical
realm. In their most skeptical moments, legal realists contend that law is
nothing more than what judges say it is.2 ' The election controversy
seems to have let the public in on the legal academy's secret by expos-
ing the political ambition of judges. It has done what decades of schol-
arship by political scientists and academic lawyers have failed to do:
convinced people that judges sometimes legislate when they purport to
interpret the law. Oddly enough, even more of us are now legal realists.
19. 1 am using "legal realist" to refer to a broad range of work in constitutional theory and
judicial politics that focuses on judicial policy-making from a variety of perspectives. It includes
theorists who focus on how judges decide cases and contend that the outcome of cases will be
significantly affected by the preferences of judges. These include, among political scientists who
study judicial politics, attitudinalists and institutionalists who work from a strategic perspective.
See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6; LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUSTICES MAKE (1998); FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME
COURT-THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000). It also includes works of positive political theory that
explore how judicial authority might contribute to policy-making. See generally James Rogers,
Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Review, 45 AM. J.
POL. ScI. 84 (2001). In addition, it includes constitutional theorists who defend a conception of
judicial authority based on an expectation of the interests judges will represent or how judges will
contribute to the debate about constitutional values. See generally Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures, supra note 8; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); PERErrl,
supra note 8; SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 8; TUSHNET, supra note 8.
20. But see MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 178 (1994).
21. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSrl 3 (1930); Karl Llewellyn,.Some Realism About
Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1237 (1931). While much of
Llewellyn's fame followed from this radical definition of law, the definition does not reflect his
mature views. It is also not even clear that he endorsed this definition at the time. WILLIAM
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 148 (1973). Finally, the definition has
roots that predate legal realism. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457-78 (1897). Nonetheless, the definition reflects a focus on adjudication that is characteristic of
both legal realism in general and Llewellyn in particular. More significantly, while this focus
does not preclude a more nuanced definition of law, it encourages the narrower perspective that, I
contend, has characterized work in constitutional theory and judicial politics.
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Have citizens finally lost their nafvet6 about law? Perhaps not: the
popular response to the controversy suggests that the public was not as
innocent as we might have thought. Both politicians and the general
public seemed to evaluate judicial decisions with an eye to their partisan
interests. When judges reached decisions that appeared to thwart victory
for one side, people who favored the other were quick to accuse the
judges of acting lawlessly, and did not engage their interpretations of
law. When judges reached decisions that promoted victory, political
allies called for closure and the restoration of order. People's concern
for the outcome of the cases overwhelmed their concern for the legal
principles that were supposed to resolve them.22 Indeed, while many
people assume that the Court still would have ruled for Bush had the
parties been reversed, no one seems to care all that much, except perhaps
some scholarly types who appear bewildered at the confirmation of the
legal realism they have professed. 3
The coalescence between academic and popular opinion is an inter-
esting, though not surprising, sidelight of legal realism's broader influ-
ence in the political culture. The legal realists, if nothing else,
emphasize that politics has a great affect on legal outcomes. Moreover,
their actions have matched their message. Generations of legal scholars
have engaged actively in constitutional politics, and have made debate
about legal doctrine a familiar part of political competition. 24 Most
notably, they have sought doctrinal change by questioning the motiva-
tions of sitting judges and subjecting the ideology of potential succes-
sors to close public scrutiny. Hence, we should not be surprised if the
public has learned the lessons of legal realism, that law is not an autono-
mous realm; law is political.25
Consider, instead, how this legal realist conclusion affects the aca-
demic view of judicial authority. Many scholars respond to the conclu-
sion that law is political by treating the judiciary like any other political
institution. They focus on how judges, as political actors, use their
power to advance their ideologies or other preferences. 26 It is this inter-
est in judicial policy-making that leads these scholars to consider judi-
cial authority from the perspective of adjudication that characterizes
22. See supra note 19. See also DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 12, 176, 187.
23. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3; Frank 1. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, in
THE VOTE, supra note 3, at 123; see also RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 489 (1995); Paul
F. Campos, The Search for Incontrovertible Visual Evidence, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 1039 (2001);
Robin West, Reconstructing the Rule of Law, 90 GEo. L.J. 215 (2001); Fried, supra note 3.
24. See GLENDON, supra note 9, at 178, 192-96.
25. See GILLMAN, supra note 3, at 6-7.
26. See Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual History, 90
GEO. L.J. 113 (2001); Gerald P. Moran, Bush v. Gore: A Renaissance of Legal Realism, 2 FLA.
COASTAL L.J. 347 (2001); see also all except WALDRON, ELY, Gaus, supra note 8.
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constitutional politics. Consequently, they view law as the legal princi-
ples that are the subject of adjudication.2"
Note that these scholars run the risk of equating law and politics,
thereby mistaking the claim that law is political with the claim that law
is politics. The latter claim denotes that law and politics are one and the
same, and thus breeds confusion given that law has qualities that distin-
guish it from other forms of politics, qualities that could be important to
how constitutional theorists think about judicial authority.28 In addition,
these qualities are obscured in the adjudicative arena, a place where the
doctrinal battles of constitutional politics are so prominent.
In their rush to join these battles, constitutional theorists should be
careful not to equate law and politics. Instead, they should look beyond
adjudication and consider what distinguishes law from other forms of
politics. By asking questions such as how does law contribute to the
political community or why do people govern themselves by law, consti-
tutional theorists might better understand that law, though a political
institution, has distinct qualities that are relevant to how we think about
judicial authority. Section IV will illustrate this point, but to grasp this
point we must shift our perspective away from adjudication because it is
easy to underestimate how adjudication influences our perspective.
B. Law and the First Wave of Election Scholarship
The academic commentary on Bush v. Gore treats the decision as
one moment in the ongoing battles of constitutional politics, and thus
reflects the policy orientation of legal realism.29 Defenders of the Court
attempt to identify some legal foundation for the Court's intervention in
presidential politics,3" but are satisfied to note the political exigencies
that explain the Court's presumption.3' The Court's critics not only
27. Consider this point carefully. I do not criticize the legal realists or their descendants; I
only note that much-not all, or even most-scholarship in the legal realist vein tends to view law
from a particular perspective, one that has relevance to how constitutional theorists frame the
problem of defining judicial authority. Moreover, 1 do not even attempt to define legal realism.
From its origins, legal realism has had a protean quality that has resisted definition, and what was
difficult then is now impossible. Therefore, I only contend that legal realism invites theorists to
focus on judicial policy-making-both in the narrow and broader ideological sense-and thus
encourages people to view law from the perspective of adjudication.
28. See GILLMAN, supro note 3, at 7. Gillman captures this possibility with the distinction
between high and low politics. See also Tushnet, supra note 7, at 170.
29. See Moran, supra note 26.
30. See John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, in THE VoiE, supra note 3, at
240; Larry Alexander, The Supreme Court, The Florida Vote, and Equal Protection, 38 SAN
DiEGo L. Riv. 1077 (2001); Martin D. Carcieri, Bush v. Gore and Equal Protection, 53 S.C. L.
REV. 63 (2001); McConnell, supra note 3; Posner, supra note 3.
31. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, in THE VOTE,
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challenge the legitimacy of its opinion as an interpretation of law,32 but
also formulate strategies to wrest the Constitution from the Court's con-
trol. They propose novel theories to challenge future appointments, 33
and some critics even press the need to rethink the authority we afford
the Court's interpretations of the Constitution. 34 The election scholar-
ship contributes to an ongoing political battle about the meaning of the
Constitution, one that will be fought in courts. It is therefore not surpris-
ing that scholars would direct their arguments to issues that might be
litigated or to political conflicts that will influence such litigation.
Now consider how this scholarship seems to evince a respect for
law that one would not expect from work in a legal realist vein. Many
of the arguments-on all sides of the issues-seem to share the premise
that judicial authority should be guided by legal principles and consid-
ered in light of virtues we associate with the rule of law. Nonetheless,
much of this scholarship is self-consciously political in the legal realist
sense that people use political means to pursue a political purpose, to
wit, influencing legal doctrine. These scholars consider the rule of law
as the means people use to pursue policy changes that follow from a
change in legal doctrine. Thus, they view law from a perspective framed
by adjudication.
Margaret Radin, for example, considers three ways that those who
oppose Bush v. Gore might respond to the damage they believe the case
does to the rule of law. The first response, one she associates with a
"hard-nosed version of 'legal realism,' '' 3 treats the legal holding as
nothing more than an exercise of political power. The Court, according
to this view, did what it always does; the Justices pursued their political
preferences and, once again, confirmed that the rule of law is only a
myth.36 A second response is to reaffirm the rule of law, notwithstand-
ing considerable evidence that the Justices made partisan decisions.
These opponents would assume that the Justices acted in good faith, and
supra note 3, at 206; George L. Priest, The 2000 Presidential Election Part 1: Reanalyzing Bush v.
Gore: Democratic Accountability and Judicial Overreaching, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 953 (2001).
But see Richard Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 811
(2001); Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress to Decide, in THE VOTE, supra note
3, at 38; David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, in THE VOTE, supra note 3,
at 184; William P. Marshall, The Supreme Court, Bush v. Gore, and Rough Justice, 29 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 787 (2001); Ward Farnsworth, "To Do a Great Right, Do a Little Wrong": A User's
Guide to Judicial Lawlessness, 86 MINN. L. REV. 227 (2001); see also Yoo, supra note 30, at 225.
32. See, e.g., Karlan, Calabresi, Rubenfeld, Radin, Tribe, supra note 3.
33. See Ackerman, supra note 3; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 186-89; Balkin, supra note 3, at
223-27; DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 197-206.
34. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 36-38. But see Martin S. Flaherty, Constitutional
Asymmetry, 69 FORIHAM L. REV. 2073 (2001).
35. See Radin, supra note 3, at 120.
36. See id. at 120-21; see also GILLMAN, supra note 3, at 8.
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would litigate to extend the holding to other contexts where its princi-
ples apply.37
Radin also presents a third response. She argues that the Justices
have forfeited their right to have their holding benefit from this pre-
sumption of good faith; she does not think the holding merits the author-
ity of law.38 Nevertheless, she uses the holding to encourage people to
reconsider their understanding of the rule of law.
Radin embraces part of the "hard-nosed" legal realist critique; she
recognizes that judicial decisions are not constrained by legal principle.
In contrast to many scholars, she clarifies the legal realist claim that law
is political. She defines the rule of law as a social practice whereby
judges apply rules in specific contexts and, in so doing, adjust those
rules to express the values of the people they govern. 39 Radin contends
that the decision in Bush v. Gore undermines a crucial aspect of this
social practice in that it flaunts the virtue of treating like cases alike,"'
and she seeks to reconstruct the rule of law as a social practice by chal-
lenging the legitimacy of the holding.4 '
We can see that Radin's argument addresses an important ramifica-
tion of legal realism. If legal outcomes both shape and are shaped by a
broader political context, we must be clear about the particular role we
expect law to play within this context. For example, each response that
Radin discusses is premised on an assumption about how law contrib-
utes to the political community. The "hard-nosed" legal realists want to
shatter the myth of the rule of law because they believe that the social
structure is sustained by citizens' perception that it is supported by the
authority of law.4" These theorists challenge the legitimacy of what they
consider to be an unjust social structure by undermining its legal founda-
tion. By contrast, the second group of thinkers hope to reinforce that
foundation because they believe it provides an avenue for the pursuit of
justice. They seek to apply the legal principles that tethered Bush v.
Gore to other contexts that involve voting rights. Radin, herself,
defends a conception of the rule of law that shares the assumption that
judicial deci'sions are a means for defining and applying values that
37. See Radin, supra note 3, at 120-21; Owen Fiss, The Fallibility of Reason, in BUSH V.
GORE, supra note 3, at 89 [hereinafter Fiss, The Fallibility of Reason]; Sunstein, supra note 3, at
206-07; Steven G. Gey, The Odd Consequences of Taking Bush v. Gore Seriously, 29 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1007; see also GILLMAN, supra note 3, at 179. Cf Hasen, supra note 3.
38. See Radin, supra note 3, at 122.
39. See id. at 123-25.
40. See id. at 117-18.
41. See id. at 125.
42. See GILLMAN, supra note 3, at 8; Tushnet, supra note 7.
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express the community's conception of justice.4 3
Radin makes a valuable contribution by identifying the problem of
how we should understand the rule of law as a social practice. She rec-
ognizes that we have to assess judicial authority in light of a broader
understanding of how law contributes to the political community. She
suggests that the rule of law has virtues that are independent of the val-
ues that are the subject of adjudication. And she might be right that
Bush v. Gore is problematic when assessed from this broader
perspective.
But is this perspective broad enough? All three responses that
Radin considers associate law with adjudication, understood as a politi-
cal process that advances, and perhaps legitimates, social values. These
responses, consequently, assess judicial authority based on how they
expect judges to decide particular cases.44 While such expectations must
have considerable influence on how we define judicial authority, there
are other considerations that do not depend on the outcomes of
adjudication.
Moreover, we grasp these considerations by examining how law
contributes to the political community in ways that are independent of
these outcomes. In contrast to hard-nosed legal realists and scholars
who seek to extend the Supreme Court's holding, Radin associates law
with broader benefits that follow from the virtue of treating like cases
alike, though she never explicitly addresses the question of what these
benefits are or why we engage in law as a social practice. Furthermore,
her argument suggests that law is a means to advance values. Thus, her
argument about how law contributes to the political community is itself
directly dependent on the outcomes of adjudication.
In the next section, I will illustrate how Radin's narrow perspective
prevents her from considering the significance of virtues that are rele-
vant to the definition of judicial authority. But first, we will see that
adjudication frames the perspective of many scholars who consider
questions of judicial authority. We will also contrast this perspective
with one that looks for law beyond the adjudicative arena.
43. See also Fiss, The Fallibility of Reason, supra note 37. Fiss has a similar conception of
law, one that shares Radin's focus on adjudication.
44. This is not to say that they are assessing judicial authority based upon the justice of
particular decisions. While they might do so, they might also make their assessment based on the
decisions they expect judges to reach across a range of cases.
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C. Two Views of Law
I. THE LEGAL REALIST VIEW OF LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
AND JUDICIAL POLITICS
In the 1950s, H.L.A. Hart challenged legal realist claims about the
nature of law.45 He argued that these claims about how judges decide
cases did not entail claims about what law is.46 Law, according to Hart,
pertains to the rules that assign authority to decide cases and it need not
determine how those cases are decided.47 Hart marks a border between
those who study what judges do and those who study jurisprudence. 8
We see a legacy of legal realism in contemporary debates in the
field of judicial politics, particularly in the work of those associated with
the attitudinalist model of judicial decision-making.49 These scholars
place great emphasis on how judges' ideological attitudes and values
influence their decisions. 5 And just as the claims of their realist prede-
cessors drifted into jurisprudence, the attitudinalists' claims have influ-
enced another field, constitutional theory. It is more difficult, though, to
mark the border between the study of judicial politics and constitutional
theory. There is considerable overlap between the questions of what
judges do and what role judges should play in a system of government,
the second of which concerns constitutional theorists. In addition, a
porous border has allowed both legal realism and its attitudinalist variant
to shape how constitutional theorists view law.
Many theorists view law only as the legal principles that might con-
strain judicial interpretation. They assume that if particular principles
do not significantly determine how judges decide cases, then law con-
tributes little to our understanding of judicial authority. Therefore, as
constitutional theory moved toward the conclusion that legal principles
do not eliminate judicial discretion, theorists have increasingly assumed
that law is irrelevant to the justification of judicial authority.
This assumption is premature. It follows from the mistaken think-
ing that Hart attributes to the legal realists: that these theorists confuse a
conception of adjudication for a conception of law. People who see law
only as the legal principles that might explain how judges decide cases
cannot grasp that law advances institutional virtues in ways that are not
directly related to the outcomes of cases.
45. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132-37 (1961).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6, at 65-66.
50. Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 305 (Lee Epstein
ed., 1995).
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Both constitutional theorists and political scientists have moved
towards the conclusion that legal principles do not decide cases, and
therefore have tended to assume that law is irrelevant to the justification
of judicial authority." I attribute this tendency to constitutional theory's
infatuation with what Alexander Bickel called the counter-majoritarian
difficulty, the need to justify judicial review's place within a govern-
ment that derives its legitimacy from elected institutions.5
2
Many constitutional theorists have treated the counter-majoritarian
difficulty as a puzzle to be solved.53 They try to demonstrate that judi-
cial review is consistent with democracy by identifying legal principles
that constrain-or should constrain-the exercise of judicial review.
This view reflects the influence legal realism has had on constitutional
theory. Legal realists challenged the idea that judges mechanically
applied an antecedent law, and thereby established the need to justify the
principles people define as law. 4 Constitutional theorists, in turn, have
transformed the problem of justifying judicial review into one of identi-
fying the legal principles that should constrain judges.5 In so doing,
they conflate three questions: (1) which values should particular legal
principles advance; (2) whether legal principles can constrain judicial
interpretation; and (3) which virtues do we advance through a system of
constitutional government, the rule of law.
Constitutional theory's infatuation with the counter-majoritarian
difficulty has also influenced work in judicial politics; it has encouraged
the attitudinalists to embrace a legal realist understanding of law. The
attitudinalists attack what they call the legal model of judicial decision-
making, a model that is an amalgamation of different responses to the
counter-majoritarian difficulty. They demonstrate that various versions
of the legal model do not constrain judicial discretion, and conclude that
51. Note that this conclusion bears mainly on the United States Supreme Court's authority
given that the Court tends to address questions that allow partisan ideology to have greater
influence and that the Justices have final authority to determine the meaning of the law. See
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6, at 71-72; GILLMAN, supra note 3, at 224-25 n.15. Nonetheless,
the question of Supreme Court authority to set the meaning of law in such cases is a central issue
of constitutional theory. Also, note that the considerations that justify the power of judicial review
are different from those that justify other forms of judicial authority. See infra text accompanying
notes 76-77. 1 will argue that considerations of law should influence each of these questions.
52. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 16-23 (1986) (1962).
53. See generally ELY, supra note 8; ACKERMAN, supra note 7; Ackerman, supra note 8;
MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1988); PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY (1992).
54. See TWINING, supra note 21, at 376; EDWARD PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 172 (1973); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL REALISM 16, 41 (1996).
55. See generally ELY, supra note 8; Ackerman, supra note 8; ACKERMAN, supra note 7;
TUSHNET, supra note 53; ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); KAHN, supra note
53.
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law reflects judicial preferences.56 Their argument views law only as an
independent variable that might explain how judges decide cases. It
suggests that the outcome of cases is explained by politics or law; the
decisions reflect the policy preferences of the judges or the legal princi-
ples they interpret. The attitudinalists conclude that legal principles do
not determine the outcome of cases, and suggest that political scientists
should not take seriously the distinction between law and politics. With
this suggestion they transform their argument about what judges do into
a claim about what law is. Like the realists, they conclude that law is
only what judges say it is. 57
This conception of law reinforces the idea that law is not relevant to
the problem of justifying judicial authority. It spurs constitutional theo-
rists who have moved beyond the problem of whether legal principles
constrain judges, and instead examines how judges affect the political
process that defines constitutional values.58 In fact, this shift in analysis
has stirred an interesting trend in recent constitutional theory: two prom-
inent theorists, whose views span the political spectrum, have argued
against judicial review based on their prediction of the values that judi-
cial decisions will advance. 59
But we cannot identify the proper scope of judicial authority, if,
like the attitudinalists, we view law only in the context of adjudication.
Theorists who equate law with the legal principles that judges enforce
ignore the possibility that we have reasons to govern ourselves by law
even if it does not constrain judges. These reasons could be relevant to
how we justify judicial authority.
it. A BROADER VIEW OF LAW
The political community uses law to resolve conflicts among the
competing interests that its citizens pursue. Everyone recognizes that
law encompasses the substantive principles6° that judges apply to decide
cases, but we often fail to see that law also encompasses the structural
principles6' that define the constitutional system of government as well
56. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6, at 33, 42-43, 49, 65.
57. See id. at 64-66. We should remember that their comments about law only relate to the
very narrow context in which they assess law's influence, the context of Supreme Court decision-
making. Moreover, they do not endorse this claim explicitly, they trace it, along with their theory
to legal realism and Justice Holmes. I, therefore, only contend that this narrow focus is a product
of how constitutional theorists think about law and that the attitudinalist discussion of law can
only reinforce the tendency.
58. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 7; PERETrl, supra note 8; SUNSTEIN, supra note 8.
59. See generally BORK, supra note 8; TUSHNET, supra note 8.
60. These principles can be expressed as constitutional, statutory, or common law.
61. The terminology is intended only to mark different ways we apply values to resolve
conflicts among citizens' interests. Structural principles are obviously substantive; indeed, the
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as the institutional virtues that characterize such a government.62 The
attitudinalists, for example, focus on the substantive principles that
judges must interpret to resolve particular controversies and ignore the
structural principles that assign authority to the political institutions that
resolve such conflicts. The election controversy involved both types of
principles. People looked to substantive principles to decide the winner
of the election and to structural principles to determine which institu-
tions had authority to resolve the controversy in accordance with the
first set.63
Moreover, the political community advances values in at least two
ways when it governs itself by law. On the one hand, it advances values
by expressing them as the legal principles that we apply to resolve con-
flicts among citizens' interests. For example, the Florida election impli-
cated substantive principles that promote values we associate with
democratic government.64 These principles of state and federal election
law-both statutory and constitutional-express values such as majority
rule, one person one vote (or a different variant of equality), and
finality.65
On the other hand, law, as a political institution, advances values
when it settles disputes through a formal set of procedures.66 Recall that
I refer to these values as virtues in order to distinguish the virtues that
animate the rule of law from the values advanced when we apply partic-
ular legal principles to resolve a case. 67 Legal theorists have identified
an array of virtues associated with the rule of law.68 They contend that
same principle can be applied to a case and to the decision concerning who decides the case. A
judge, for example, can apply the principle of equality stated by the Equal Protection Clause and,
plausibly, a government can promote the value of equality by having judges check legislative and
executive institutions. Moreover, judges must sometimes apply principles that have a structural
component such as the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
62. But see, e.g., CHARLES BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969); ELY, supra note 8. Theorists have recognized that considerations of constitutional
structure are important for interpreting the Constitution. Thus, they view the question of how we
define judicial authority in terms of adjudication.
63. In addition, note that each set included principles of state and federal statutory and
constitutional law.
64. Structural principles also would advance democratic values, and they could be expressed
by both statutory and constitutional law-though they tend to be products of constitutional law.
65. Observe that these values are not exclusive to democratic government. Consider finality,
for example; it can be advanced by any scheme that clarifies the conditions under which citizens
should consider a political controversy resolved. The failure of the Florida election law suggests
that this is not a non-consequential value. We can see that this value provides reason to seriously
consider the Secretary of State's adherence to what she perceived was the statutory deadline for
counting the votes.
66. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (1969).
67. See supra text accompanying note 4.
68. These include, among others, public reasonableness, see Gerald Gaus, Public Reason and
the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: NoMos, at xxxvi (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994); MACEDO, supra
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these virtues characterize institutional processes that satisfy certain con-
ditions. Although these conditions might not be satisfied if legal princi-
ples do not constrain judicial decision-making,69 this is not necessarily
the case.
Steven Macedo, for example, links the rule of law to the goal of
public justification, and thus the virtue of reasonability.7" He contends
that judges respect citizens as reasonable beings by justifying the exer-
cise of government authority in terms that litigants can grasp.7 I This
conception of the rule of law depends on judges exercising their author-
ity in a certain manner-they have to justify their exercise of authority
in certain terms-but it does not depend on legal principles constraining
judges.72 Judges, according to this view, can in some circumstances
decide cases for either party so long as their decisions are properly
justified.
Moreover, though Macedo's argument appears to be focused on
adjudication, the virtue that drives his argument lies outside the adjudi-
cative arena. It is possible that an institutional structure without judicial
review could better satisfy Macedo's conception of reasonability.
Indeed, we have already seen that Waldron appeals to a virtue outside of
adjudication to defend such a structure in his attack against judicial
review. He claims that we must consider the authority of institutions
that resolve conflicts about justice in light of virtues that are not impli-
cated by such conflicts. He endorses legislation as an alternative to judi-
cial review because he believes that a well-ordered legislative process
note 8; fairness, see FREDERICK A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SURFDOM 75-76 (1945); FREDRICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-
MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 135-36 (1991); integrity, see DWORKIN, supra note 8; equal respect
for citizens, see WALDRON, supra note 8; social coordination, see GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM
AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 203-04 (1986) (discussing Bentham's jurisprudence); finality,
see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1371-77 (1997).
69. Keith Whittington has argued that judges undermine a system of self-government when
they enforce constitutional principles that do not reflect the Constitution's original meaning. See
WHrIINGTON, supra note 8. His approach is emblematic of theorists who tether originalist
interpretation to considerations of how the Constitution, as law, contributes to the political
community. Theorists have recently defended originalism in terms of various institutional virtues.
See Richard S. Kay, Aomerican Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM (Larry Alexander ed.,
1998) (defending originalism as advancing the virtue of constancy and thus promoting order);
Michael J. Perry, What is "the Constitution"? (and Other Fundamental Questions), in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra (defending originalism as necessary to advance the Constitution's aim
of coordinating social interaction); Jed Rubenfeld, Legitimacy and Interpretation, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra (linking originalist interpretation to the virtue of freedom).
70. See MACEDO, supra note 8, at 159-62.
71. Id.
72. This is only true in cases where judges can provide adequate reasons to support both sides
of an issue. This assumption, however, appears to describe the controversial Supreme Court
decisions that tend to be the focus of debates among constitutional theorists.
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will be characterized by the virtue of equality no matter the values
advanced by particular statutes.73
We now return to the academic response to the Florida election.
We will see that scholars could not escape the grip of adjudication and
thus could not address normative considerations that were outside of the
immediate controversy. In particular, they did not pay adequate atten-
tion to fairness, stability, and predictability, institutional virtues that
should inform a definition of the judicial authority.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE FLORIDA ELECTION:
NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
The vitriol surrounding the election controversy colors people's
assessment of how judges decided the cases, and perhaps made it inevi-
table that some disappointed partisans would challenge judicial author-
ity. Many have claimed that the judges exceeded their authority by
deciding a case that was beyond the relevant law."4 Others have ques-
tioned the way that judges have exercised their authority to interpret
law.75 Little attention has been paid, however, to the question of why
we would assign judges this authority.
In this section, we will see that citizens' intense interest in the elec-
tion's outcome has obscured the considerations that underlie the author-
ity that the judges exercised. More particularly, I contend that the
academic response to the election controversy reveals a tendency to
view judicial authority from a perspective framed by adjudication, and
that this perspective prevents scholars from considering institutional vir-
tues that might explain why we allow judges to interpret law.
A. Fairness, Stability, and Consistency: The Rule of Law and the
Definition of Judicial Authority
Consider an irony. Judges, as servants of the law, are expected to
interpret legal principles based on the values those principles express
and not based on their personal preferences, but the need to interpret
these principles suggests that we do not know how those values should
be applied in particular contexts. One reason we assign judges the
power to interpret the law is that the legal principles are not clear. Hart
73. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18. Indeed, Waldron believes that such a process
would advance the virtue of equality even if legislators chose to pass a law that would offend
many people's substantive conception of the value of equality. In order to grasp Waldron's
argument one must distinguish the institutional virtues reflected by a system of law-the process
through which a community resolves its disagreements about justice-and the values we apply to
resolve such disagreements.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 104-19.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 120-43.
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attributes this uncertainty to law's open texture. General legal princi-
ples, according to Hart, cannot resolve particular controversies when
they have not been articulated sufficiently to do so. Attempts to apply
such principles must overcome vague or ambiguous language as well as
conflicts among the values that different principles seek to advance.
Hart contends that in such circumstances judges must supplement the
principles implicated by the case; they must legislate.76
The Florida controversy arose because of the open texture of Flor-
ida's election law. The conflicting legal principles that governed the
election-both state and federal-were not up to the task of identifying
a clear winner. These conflicting principles made it possible for judges
to interpret the law to the advantage of either candidate. In other words,
there was no source of law to provide unassailable answers to the legal
questions posed by the election. Given this circumstance, it is ironic
how readily partisans on both sides accused judges of lawlessness, of
acting without regard to the law. We looked to judges to resolve the
controversy because it was not clear what law applied in the circum-
stances of the election.
The Florida controversy, then, introduces the question of why we
might defer to judicial interpretations of unclear laws; what a priori con-
siderations would lead us to let judges supplement legislation such as the
constitutional and statutory scheme that failed to mark a clear winner of
the election. This question takes three different forms. First, there is a
question of statutory interpretation: the Florida Supreme Court sought to
resolve the controversy through its interpretation of Florida election
law.77 Second, there is a question of constitutional interpretation: the
United States Supreme Court exercised judicial review and ruled that
Florida's election law, as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court, vio-
lated the Constitution's equal protection guarantee.
The United States Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court,
then, did not exercise the same type of power. Moreover, the charges of
judicial usurpation that were issued against both courts suggest a third
question of judicial authority, one that we also associate with debates
about judicial review: the extent that we should allow judges to set the
meaning of the Constitution for future cases.7 8
76. See HART, supra note 45, at 124-32.
77. It also introduced this question at the federal level; the Supreme Court had to interpret
congressional statutes relating to elections.
78. The problem of supremacy itself can be posed in different ways, and some of these ways
do not go to the problem of extending decisions to future cases. We might, for example, believe
that in resolving this type of controversy, the judges are claiming the authority of an elected
institution. Moreover, the question of supremacy can take at least two different forms, even
assuming the context of future decisions. On one hand, it could be left open as a question that is
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Although each of these questions concerns the authority to interpret
unclear legal principles, they are different questions. Moreover, institu-
tional virtues that are relevant to how we answer these questions take on
different significance given differences in the questions. Therefore, we
cannot evaluate how the judges exercised their authority until we have a
better grasp of the virtues that might justify such authority. To do so, we
must understand how the rule of law influences our answers to these
different questions.
The Florida Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
applied legal principles to resolve an immediate controversy. We nor-
mally think that judges have a very strong claim to authority when they
apply legal principles in particular contexts. To understand why, we
must consider how our conception of the separation of powers is
informed by a virtue of fairness.
It was striking how readily critics charged these courts with usurp-
ing legislative power, given that they exercised authority comfortably
within the conventional understanding of the separation of powers. One
reason that we divide power among the Legislature, Judiciary, and Exec-
utive is to ensure that legislation is written at a level of generality that
reduces the chances that legislators will enact self-interested or biased
statutes.7 9 The separation of powers, then, advances fairness, a virtue
that is closely associated with an influential conception of the rule of
law.8"
We can see that this virtue might also help us understand judicial
authority. According to this view, we maintain the advantages of gen-
eral legislation by assigning judges the authority to interpret legislation
and apply general principles in particular contexts. Law's open texture
is a consequence of general legislation, and we assign judges the author-
ity to eliminate this open texture because we expect, ex ante, that it is
fairer to the parties to have judges rather than partisan executives sup-
plement the indeterminate law that is applicable to their case. We also
decided by the political interaction of different institutions. Supremacy, according to this view,
measures the power institutions have to express their preferences in the legal doctrine that
emerges from the broader political process. On the other hand, we might think that the law should
influence that process by clarifying the power that different institutions have by, for instance,
resolving the supremacy question itself. We have seen recent proposals to do so by amending the
Constitution to reduce the scope of judicial review. See BORK, supra note 8, at 96-119; TUSHNET,
supra note 8.
79. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 57 (James Madison), No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see
also HAYEK, supra note 68, at 75-76; GEORGE W. CAREY, THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 51-56 (1989); RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY:
JUSTICE AND THF RULE OF LAW 142-44 (1998).
80. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION 10 THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 1915
(1982); See also HAYEK, supra note 68.
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expect that there are fewer risks when judges exercise this authority than
if legislators resolve cases through retroactive statutes. 81
Note that although fairness should inform a definition of judicial
authority, it applies differently to the three questions we identified. For
example, fairness suggests that we should not allow a legislature to
resolve an immediate controversy based on a statute that it has previ-
ously passed, but this consideration has no bearing on the question of
who should have authority to apply the Constitution to resolve contro-
versies.82 Neither Congress nor the Court wrote the Constitution.83
In addition, the considerations of fairness that might lead us to
assign judges the authority to interpret statutes or constitutions do not
extend to the Court's power to set the meaning of law for future cases.
Indeed, we deny judges ultimate authority to set the meaning of statutes;
legislatures have authority to pass new laws that clarify the meaning of
earlier statutes, and, in effect, to reverse judicial interpretations of those
statutes.
Fairness suggests one reason we might assign legislatures this
authority. Legislatures, ideally, consider issues from a perspective that
encompasses broader interests than courts. Judges have to resolve par-
ticular controversies. Thus their interpretations of law are greatly influ-
enced by the evidence of litigants who have important interests that
depend on those interpretations. By contrast, the legislative process
accommodates a wider range of evidence, and legislators have incentive
to consider the various interests that might be affected by their deci-
sions.84 It would seem that these considerations apply with equal force
in giving legislatures authority to set the meaning of constitutions.
85
81. See GILLMAN, supra note 3, at 80.
82. In the election cases, Congress had a claim to exercise the authority based on the text of
the Constitution, but consider other contexts. Imagine that Congress passed legislation that gave
itself a supervisory power over Supreme Court decisions regarding the meaning of the
Constitution, that Congress could reverse the outcomes of particular cases. While it would seem
that such legislation would be in tension with the Constitution's ban against Bills of Attainder and
would violate people's understanding of the separation of powers, my point is that the meaning of
the Constitution is a question of constitutional politics, and that our answers to such questions
should be informed by higher order virtues such as the virtue of fairness that informs the
separation of powers. When viewed from this perspective, such legislation is not obviously
unconstitutional. Nonetheless, there are considerations that would make it seem unwise, most
notably the possibility that Congress would have power to resolve constitutional controversies that
define its own power. We should note, though, that the same problem arises in cases when the
Court determines the extent of its power.
83. Other considerations related to fairness would certainly influence how we answer this
question. See infra text accompanying notes 84-91.
84. See WALDRON, supra note 8, at 66.
85. Note how this understanding of fairness shades into Waldron's understanding of equal
respect. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18. We see two different aspects of fairness. On
one hand, a decision is fairer to the extent it is made by a process that is further removed from the
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More significantly, fairness has greater significance for judicial
authority to resolve immediate controversies. In most circumstances,
judges have the final say as to the immediate outcome of a given case.86
While an interpretation of law has tangible consequences for the liti-
gants, it is only one factor that influences what the law will mean for
future cases. The power of judges to set the meaning of law is contin-
gent; legal doctrine is often shaped by political forces that are beyond
the control of judges. We know, for example, that elected institutions
have considerable influence in determining whether court holdings are
effective.87 The scholarly response to Bush v. Gore itself indicates that
at least some commentators believe that the Court cannot control the
future effects of its precedents, even when it tries to limit a holding to a
unique set of facts.88 People engage in constitutional politics knowing
that judges have considerable discretion to evade precedents89 and that
judges take advantage of this freedom.9"
In defining judicial authority, therefore, we must be clear that while
a judge's influence over future cases is contingent, she has final author-
ity over the immediate parties to a controversy and has significant lee-
way to favor parties based on partisan considerations. 9' We should
assign fairness greater weight in such circumstances, given that the
finality of the holdings makes it difficult to remedy the unfairness of
particular decisions. We must have reasons, ex ante, to think that
judges, in contrast to elected institutions, are more likely to exercise this
authority without regard to their own interests. It is not surprising,
therefore, that theorists have sought to ground judicial authority in con-
siderations relating to the independence, legal training, and professional
immediate parties affected by a decision. On the other hand, a decision is fairer when it results
from a process in which more of the parties that might be affected by the decision have an
opportunity to influence that decision.
86. Thus, the Supreme Court has final authority over the outcomes of particular cases.
Although this is the norm, there are exceptions. For example, Executives sometimes have power
to grant pardons and suspend sentences. Congress could, conceivably, compensate people who
suffer because of an unfair decision, though it would not be able to have a winning party
compensate the losing party because of the unfairness of the decision from which he or she
derived benefits.
87. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 73-96 (1991).
88. See Fiss, The Fallibility of Reason, supra note 37, at 89.
89. See generally HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY
WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999).
90. Joseph F. Kobylka, The Mysterious Case of Establishment Litigation: How Organized
Litigants Foiled Legal Change, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS, supra note 50, at 93.
91. 1 am assuming that non-judicial institutions will have the same ability to manipulate
doctrine and precedents to achieve an outcome that they like. But recall that there is likely a range
of cases where the requirement of principled decision-making could serve as a restraint. See
supra text accompanying note 68.
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experience of judges.92
Fairness is not the only virtue relevant to the general problem of
how to define judicial authority. Indeed, it is not the only virtue relevant
to the particular question of judges' authority to resolve particular con-
troversies. Given the fact that a judicial decision is likely to be the final
word on immediate controversies, we would want the institution that
resolves those controversies to promote stability. The legal system does
so by encouraging losing parties to end their disputes, notwithstanding
the perception that important interests were compromised in the resolu-
tion of these disputes. It asks people to subordinate these interests to a
broader interest in maintaining social order.
The rule of law, then, seeks stability. It instills in litigants-and
potential litigants-the sense that their interests are given adequate con-
sideration, even though the outcome of a particular case must always be
a blow for one of the parties. To do so, the rule of law must establish a
standard by which disputes will be assessed, and create an institutional
structure to apply those standards in a manner that convinces people that
legal decisions follow from pre-existing standards, not from the deci-
sion-maker's interest in the controversy.93
Therefore, we must consider judges' authority to interpret law in
light of the virtue of stability. Do we have reason, for example, to
believe that judges will be more skilled than elected officials at commu-
nicating the bases of their decisions? Would we expect them to be better
at explaining how abstract standards apply to particular controversies?
As with fairness, it would seem that legal training and judicial experi-
ence might work in judges' favor.94 On the other hand, elected officials
might have greater political savvy and thus have a better sense of how
people will respond to their decisions.95 In applying the norm of stabil-
ity to various institutional structures, we also would have to account for
psycho-sociological factors relating to how citizens perceive courts, leg-
islators, and the authority of law. 96
92. Legal training or experience, for example, might make judges better at accounting for
their own partisan interests. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LosT LAWYER 55-60, 110-16
(1993); see also SUnstein, supra note 8.
93. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). This case ties legitimacy to the
perception that decisions are principled as well as the fact that they actually be principled. We see
that stability is related to the value of reasonableness that Steve Macedo associates with the rule of
law. See supra text accompanying note 68. We can also see that the norm of stability is
complemented by the norm of fairness. An institution that is likely to decide cases fairly will give
people reason to accept the authority of its decisions.
94. See generally KRONMAN, supra note 92.
95. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974);
JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (1981); RICHARD FENNO, HOME STYLE:
HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS (1978).
96. It would be relevant, for example, that people viewed the judicial process as fairer than
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Predictability is the last institutional virtue that we will consider. It
is closely related to stability. It is concerned with the standards the
political community uses to resolve disputes among its members and
reflects our interest that these standards be clear. People are more likely
to subordinate their particular interests to a general interest in the social
order when the standards used to sustain order are sufficiently clear.
Predictable standards allow people to define their interests with a sense
of the demands that an interest in social order will place on their pursuit
of such interests.
The rule of law fosters predictability by providing citizens informa-
tion about how the government will exercise its authority, thereby help-
ing to coordinate complex social interactions. Citizens can pursue their
preferences with some idea of the consequences of various actions they
might take. Consider a simple example: the way we use law to control
traffic flow. Law in this case succeeds by establishing clear rules about
where to drive, when to stop, and how fast to go. Chaos would ensue if
the law were not clear. Imagine, for example, what would happen dur-
ing a Manhattan rush hour if a power surge caused all the traffic lights to
flash green.
Constitutional law serves an analogous function by establishing
clear rules that allow people to anticipate the use of political power. 97 It
defines the conditions that trigger the exercise of such power as well as
the conditions that legitimate its exercise. Citizens, then, pursue their
interests with more information concerning when they can command
government assistance and how to avoid government sanction.
Predictability, in contrast to both stability and fairness, is mainly
relevant to the question of judicial authority to set the meaning of law
for future cases. 98 In addressing this question, we must consider
whether judges have characteristics that would make them sensitive to
our interest that legal doctrine be predictable. It is conceivable that their
independence, legal training, and commitment to the law would make
the legislative process, even if that was not the case. We would have to weigh this factor against
the likelihood that judges would be able to use this false perception to advance their own interests
and perhaps violate other virtues that are relevant to our definition of judicial authority.
97. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 68, at 136, 1371-74; Kay, supra note 69.
98. Similarly, we would have to consider these virtues in light of the greater complexities of
the institutional arrangements that influence the content of legal doctrine. We might, for example,
think that people believe that judicial decisions have a stronger claim to legitimacy than legislative
decisions. This would allow the Court to have greater influence on the content of legal doctrine
and would be a reason not to clarify the Court's superior claim to set the meaning of the
Constitution-for example, by passing a constitutional amendment that says that the Legislature
and the Executive must accede to the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. On the other
hand, we might think that it would skew authority in favor of the Legislature if we were to pass an
amendment that would allow Congress to pass legislation to reverse a Supreme Court precedent.
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them more sensitive than elected officials to this interest.99 On the other
hand, we might think that the legislature has greater incentive to deter-
mine how different parties respond to legal rules and thus might be in a
better position to make the law more predictable.
The virtues of fairness, stability, and predictability are significant to
the problem of defining a conception of judicial authority. This is not to
say that these virtues explain why we should defer to judicial interpreta-
tions of unclear law, but only that important reasons for why people
have chosen to do so relate to these virtues. Note that I have not
defended a conception of judicial authority, nor have I argued that these
are the only-or even the most important-virtues that would inform
such a conception. We have not even considered how institutional vir-
tues weigh against our desire for just decisions, " "° or how our under-
standing of these virtues should be adjusted if we were to accept the
conclusions of critics who point to the election cases to confirm the exis-
tence of partisan judging. I only contend that an adequate conception of
judicial authority must account for the significance of institutional vir-
tues, and that the context of adjudication makes it difficult to even con-
sider them.
We now return to the academic response to the election controversy
in order to illustrate how the stakes of the litigation influenced the schol-
arly assessment of the power that the judges exercised. Most scholars
did not even consider the virtues that we have identified, and the few
that did seemed to mistake the bearing these virtues have on the defini-
tion of judicial authority.""
B. The Normative Analysis of Florida
The stakes of adjudication make it difficult to see beyond the
immediate litigation. Those who study constitutional politics are well
aware of the danger that the context of a particular case may bias judg-
ment. It is difficult to evaluate competing interpretations of the Consti-
tution without considering how those interpretations will effect our lives.
We know, for example, that people's view of the Second Amendment
seems to correlate with their attitude about guns, that people's view of
the Equal Protection Clause seems to correlate with attitudes about race,
gender, and discrimination, and that people's view of the Due Process
Clause seems to correlate with attitudes about sexuality. I do not argue
99. Predictability does not require that outcomes be certain, it only requires that people have
some sense of where the law runs out and how judges-or other institutional actors-will
approach the problem of clarifying the relevant standard.
100. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 8; Radin, supra note 3; Fiss, The Fallibility of
Reason, supra note 37.
101. For a notable exception, see West, supra note 23.
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that people interpret the Constitution with specific results in mind or to
advance a personal agenda; I only note that issues of constitutional law
are often sufficiently complex to allow people to interpret constitutional
values in a manner most favorable to their immediate interests.' 12
Things become more complex when we examine questions of con-
stitutional structure, questions such as the proper scope of judicial
authority. It is at this second level of abstraction where we must define
the process that should resolve disagreements about constitutional val-
ues. In so doing, we must avoid potential biases: our immediate inter-
ests might influence the conception of constitutional values we favor,
and our conception of constitutional values might influence which insti-
tution we believe should resolve disagreements about these values. 10 3
It is these biases that lead people to view judicial authority from the
perspective of constitutional politics. They focus attention on the direct
effects of judicial holdings-the immediate outcome and the constitu-
tional values that we expect to be advanced because of these out-
comes-and distract attention from the questions pertaining to the
definition of judicial authority. We will see that many scholars seem to
be more interested in fighting battles to influence constitutional doctrine
than in examining the decision in light of a normative standard. These
scholars do not even consider the institutional virtues that we have
identified.
A second group of scholars have assessed the decisions in light of
institutional virtues. They too seem more interested in joining the bat-
tles about future doctrine than in clarifying the normative standard that
underlies their criticism of the Court. They question the legitimacy of
these decisions as part of a strategy to weaken the Court or influence its
future holdings. These scholars do not address the question of whether
these decisions should lead us to redefine our conception of judicial
authority. More significantly, they do not provide an adequate account
of the virtues that should inform such a conception of judicial authority.
102. Cf Sunstein, supra note 8.
103. In other words, it would be wrong for me to favor judicial review because I believe that
judges, in comparison to elected institutions, are more likely to resolve these disagreements in a
manner that advances my vision of constitutional values. This, of course, assumes that we do not
empower institutions with a goal of maximizing a particular vision of justice. Radin and Fiss
seem to reject this assumption. They do not distinguish among the questions of what justice
requires, i.e., what is the best institutional arrangement for pursuing justice and how do we apply
notions of justice to resolve our disagreements about the former questions. Both would seem to
accept unjust decisions, if in the long run they expected the Justices-in comparison to elected
institutions-to reach decisions that are more in line with the requirements of justice. They do not
address the possibility, however, that people have fundamental disagreements about justice and
that we act unjustly by allowing an institution such as the Judiciary to resolve these
disagreements. See WALDRON, supra note 8.
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I. JUDGES AS USURPERS
Critics on both sides of the election controversy allege that judges
usurped power by making decisions that should have been left to elected
institutions. The charge of usurpation has come in a variety of forms,
but the different forms all follow from a perspective framed by adjudica-
tion. Critics address how judges exercised their power; did the judges
act properly in deciding these cases? It would seem that an analysis of
this question should be framed by the considerations of why people
assign judges the authority to interpret law. But we will see that, for the
most part, these scholars pursued a very different agenda.
While the charge of usurpation is familiar in debates about judicial
review, it seems out of place in a discussion of the election controversy.
Critics who allege usurpation in response to controversial decisions are
often concerned that judges usurp legislative power by setting the mean-
ing of the Constitution for future cases. In contrast, the election cases
implicated the question of why judges should have power to resolve
immediate controversies.' 4
Consider Roe v. Wade. It stirred debate about the general legisla-
tive question of whether women should have the right to choose to have
an abortion. Roe herself received comparatively little attention and did
not benefit directly from the right the Court defined on her behalf. The
election cases, by contrast, are unlikely to have much influence on sub-
sequent cases; they were controversial because of the effect people
expected them to have on the outcome of this past election." 5
More significantly, consider how the charge of usurpation confuses
the basis of the authority that the judges exercised. Critics who charge
judicial usurpation suggest that judges derive authority from the legal
principles they enforce, and abuse that authority by writing new legisla-
tion. Yet this view mistakes the problem of judicial authority that the
104. See Yoo, supra note 30, at 225.
105. By contrast, in a case like Roe v. Wade, the Court presumably would be much more
concerned about the general right to choose to have an abortion than whether Roe herself is able to
have one. Indeed, the latter question was moot by the time the Court reached its holding.
Similarly, people were more concerned with how the Florida Supreme Court's resolution of the
vagueness of Florida election law would affect this case and not how it would affect future cases.
Imagine that the same issues came up with regard to an election for a seat in the Florida Senate,
and imagine that control of the Senate did not turn on the election. It would seem that the Florida
legislature would abide by the Florida Supreme Court's decision-and probably allow it to
continue as a precedent, an authoritative interpretation of Florida's election law-whether the
Court allowed recounts or not, regardless of the rule the Court chose to resolve the problem of
voter intention. Similarly, one would expect very little controversy when the Florida legislature
ultimately chooses the rules that will govern future elections. In all likelihood, any controversy
that arises will be a reflection of this past election. It is hard to imagine that the questions to be
answered would generate controversy in the absence of facts about a particular election.
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election controversy poses. We have seen that the relevant question is
who should legislate to resolve controversies that arise when legal prin-
ciples are not clear enough to constrain a decision."°6 At most, we
should consider whether our perception of judicial partisanship should
lead us to reconsider the reasons that we allow judges to legislate in
these contexts.
The charge of usurpation obscures these reasons. This would
explain why so few scholars have examined the significance of judges'
decisions in light of a priori expectations about fairness and stability.0 7
Could we have expected better from Florida's legislators? It was
astounding how little comment was sparked by their threat to settle the
election through retroactive legislation, a move that directly contravenes
our expectation that legislators should write general laws, not laws that
benefit particular people.
Moreover, it is not clear that the scholars who bring this charge
have much concern for the question of judicial authority to set the mean-
ing of the Constitution. Consider the claims of those who link Bush v.
Gore to recent decisions in which the Court has declared its supremacy
in the realm of constitutional interpretation by asserting that Congress
and the Executive must accede to its understanding of the Constitution.
These scholars contend that the Court's holding in Bush v. Gore
manifests the same distrust of elected institutions, and, what is more,
suggests a new boldness-the Court in Bush v. Gore has ventured into
an arena that is more clearly political. 108
Note, however, that these scholars do not seek to reevaluate the
Court's authority in light of virtues such as fairness and predictability. 109
106. See supra text accompanying note 76.
107. The issue of stability has arisen in response to those who contend that the Court avoided a
constitutional crisis. This debate centers on whether the Justices made a correct decision, whether
there really was a potential crisis, not whether judges were in a better position to promote stability.
It is not clear that the Florida cases should lead us to question the judges' authority because of the
virtue of fairness. Although the Florida Supreme Court Justices might have had a preference for
one of the candidates, they did not participate in the presidential campaign. By contrast, Florida's
Governor was actively involved in the campaign and a brother of one of the candidates; Florida's
Secretary of State, was co-chair of the state campaign for one of the candidates and a close ally of
the Governor; and Florida's Attorney General was co-chair of the state campaign for the other
candidate. One would think that each of these people would have difficulty insulating their
interpretation of law from the partisan pressures of their constituents and parties. Indeed, it has
already been suggested that the Republican Party will reward Florida's Secretary of State for her
partisanship.
108. Robert Post, Sustaining the Premise of Legality, in Buso v. GORE, supra note 3, at 101-
05; Lawrence Tribe, EROG v. HSUB: Through the Looking Glass, in Busii v. GORE, supra note
3, at 62-63; see also Karlan, supra note 3, at 78; Tushnet, supra note 7, at 173-74; Briffault, supra
note 3; Kramer, supra note 5, at 14.
109. These critics, however, do consider these virtues indirectly. They contend that though the
legislative process is more chaotic than the judicial process, we have reasons to favor a legislative
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Although they contend that the reasons to favor a legislative resolution
of the controversy outweigh the instability that might be wrought by an
extended and disorderly political conflict,'" they do not develop the
comparison.'' More significantly, they seem to consider the case from
the perspective of adjudication. Rather than address the normative ques-
tion of whether the Court should have the authority to decide cases such
as this, these scholars criticize the decision the Court made in this partic-
ular case. They contend that the Court should have let the controversy
be settled by elected institutions. Indeed, some worry that attacks
against the holding go too far and might undermine the Court's ability to
exercise its authority in the future.' 2
These scholars, therefore, appear more concerned about constitu-
tional politics than they do about constitutional theory. They do not
contend that elected institutions, rather than the Court, should have final
authority to set the meaning of the Constitution. It seems, instead, that
they seek to limit the influence of this Supreme Court. By alleging judi-
cial usurpation, they encourage elected institutions to challenge the Jus-
tices' interpretations of the Constitution. Such a political response
would constrain these Justices without imposing formal restriction on
the Court's power-compare this response to the constitutional amend-
ments that critics such as Tushnet and Bork have proposed as a means to
limit judicial supremacy.'" These scholars thus challenge this Court
while leaving open the question of who should have final authority to set
the meaning of the Constitution.'"
resolution of the controversy, and these reasons have to do with the likelihood that the Legislature
is more representative than the Court. Nonetheless, the comparison is never really developed-
they never really weigh the interest in fairness and stability against the gains from a legislative
resolution-and they seem to attribute the Court's refusal to acknowledge these reasons to the
make-up of' this Court. Thus, they seem to consider the case based on how the judges exercised
their power. They criticize the Court for not giving adequate weight to the reasons that they
should defer to legislatures rather than addressing the normative question of whether the Court
should have the authority to make such a determination.
110. These reasons mainly had to do with the likelihood that the legislature is more
representative than the Court.
I11. They, therefore, do not even consider the possibility that we might want judges to decide
cases like this because of our interest in promoting stability in the aftermath of such controversies.
Tribe's concern for the Court's influence over future cases seems to blind him to the
considerations that apply when we gauge who should have the authority to resolve particular
controversies.
112. See supra text accompanying note 37. Note especially efforts of scholars who seek to
sustain the Court's authority over the long term. See Tribe, supra note 3; Fiss, The Fallibility of
Reason, supra note 37; and Calabresi, supra note 3. Cf DERSHowrrz, supra note 3, at 182.
Dershowitz has recommendations for controlling courts that abuse their authority, but he also
recognizes the need to maintain the Court's independence so that it can continue to serve as a
viable check on other institutions of government.
113. See supra note 59.
114. We have seen that some critics challenge the Court's decision while hoping to avoid this
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Nonetheless, the charge of usurpation has also taken more modest
and, perhaps, appropriate forms. Some critics who raise this charge do
not really challenge the Court's authority to resolve controversies based
on its interpretation of law. They do not consider whether the judiciary
is the best institution to interpret an existing legal scheme. They, in
contrast, ask which is the best institution to decide an election that ended
in a tie.' '5 In other words, they assume that the law had run its course
and could no longer be useful in resolving the election controversy.
These critics contend that elected institutions have the stronger claim to
authority because there was no law to apply.
Many, for example, have argued that Bush v. Gore posed a political
question, one that should not have been subject to judicial resolution.' 6
These arguments are formidable, especially when we consider the vari-
ous legal texts that seem to assign elected institutions the authority to
resolve election disputes.' 1 7  Yet these arguments also view the case
from an adjudicatory perspective. The definition of a political question
is an issue of constitutional politics that was relevant to this case. These
arguments do not challenge the authority judges have to determine
whether a case poses a political question. Instead, they argue that the
judges exercised this authority badly by deciding these cases on the mer-
its." 8 It is important to note, however, that at least some of these argu-
ments appealed to virtues of the rule of law to explain why the judges
should have refused to exercise authority in these cases.'19
larger question. They do so because they fear that resolving this question might lead to too great a
shift of power to Congress, the institution most likely to be assigned this authority. See supra note
112.
115. See generally Garrett, supra note 31; Calabresi, supra note 3.
116. See generally Garret, supra note 31; Shane, supra note 3; Friedman, supra note 31;
Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, in THE VOTE, supra note 3; Rachel E. Barkow, More
Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002); Tribe, supra note 3, at 63-65.
117. See Calabresi, supra note 3, at 13 1-37. Calabresi notes that the state of Florida elects a
Secretary of State to resolve the very questions that arose in this election. Id. He also notes that
Secretary Harris's responsiveness to partisan pressure suggests that the decision to assign this
authority to an elected institution might not have been a good one, and it similarly might be the
case that the Florida Supreme Court's performance should lead the people of Florida to reconsider
the authority they assign that court. Id. I would also note that when viewed from the perspective
of Florida constitutional politics, there remains a question of how the Secretary of State's
executive authority influences the authority of the Florida Supreme Court, and that it is not clear
that the Florida Supreme Court lacks the authority to address the question.
118. To the best of my knowledge, no one would have thought the Court had acted
illegitimately by considering the claims that this was a political question or that Congress had a
stronger claim to resolve the dispute.
119. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional Lessons from the 2000 Presidential Election, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 975 (2001).
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Ii. BUSH V. GORE AS AN AFFRONT TO THE RULE OF LAW
A second group of scholars claim that Bush v. Gore does great
damage to the rule of law. More particularly, they argue that the Court
acted unfairly by refusing to extend its holding to future cases. In so
doing, it failed to treat like cases alike. Although these scholars criticize
the fairness of the Court's holding, they too focus on adjudication. They
criticize the decision as unprincipled and consider how it will influence
future holdings, but they do not consider how this holding, as an exam-
ple of unfairness, should influence our definition of judicial authority.
Moreover, they do not address the significance that stability has for this
case or for the broader question of why we would assign judges the
authority to resolve controversies based on their interpretations of law.
Some scholars have argued that Bush v. Gore is unfair. They, how-
ever, see fairness as a quality of particular decisions rather than a virtue
of the broader system of law; they gauge fairness by the constraining
force of legal principle. And while we would expect that judges
advance fairness by resolving controversies based on previously defined
legal principles, this is only one aspect of the virtue of fairness.
Many scholars have questioned the fairness-and thus legiti-
macy-of Bush v. Gore, given the Court's failure to ground its holdings
in principle. 2 ' Legal principles constrain judging in at least one of two
ways. On the one hand, holdings could follow from existing legal prin-
ciples or from prior interpretations of those principles. On the other
hand, judges might be constrained by the knowledge that their holdings
will become precedents. 12 1 Judges, according to this view, are less
likely to be swayed by contingencies that follow from the immediate
contexts of cases if they cannot limit the impact of their decisions to
those contexts. 
22
The constraining force of principle is closely related to the rule of
120. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 75-78; Radin, supra note 3, at 114-18; DERSHOWITZ,
supra note 3. Dershowitz's claim is stronger in that he believes that the Court not only failed to
base its decision on principles that it would extend to future cases, but it also made a decision that
ignored principles that these same judges have previously defined. See, e.g., Fiss, The Fallibility
of Reason, supra note 37, at 84, 94-95. Fiss's view of the case is different in that he thinks that
law's facility at promoting values is independent of the decisions that judges make. Id. See also
GILLMAN, supra note 3, at 8-9. Gillman illustrates how expectations of fairness are related to
people's perceptions of how the Court should decide cases. Id. This view links fairness to
legitimacy, understood as whether people accept judicial decisions as opposed to legitimacy
understood in terms of the reasons that we might assign judges authority.
121. Indeed, one of the central criticisms of Bush v. Gore is that the opinion itself attempts to
limit its applicability to the immediate case, and thus evades the discipline that follows from the
requirement of treating like cases alike.
122. See Calabresi, supra note 3, at 67; Fried, supra note 3, at 8; Post, supra note 108, at 108-
09; Radin, supra note 3, at 114-18; Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 21.
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law and its demand that judges be neutral, non-arbitrary, non-partisan,
and fair. 23 Nonetheless, most of the scholars who contend that Bush v.
Gore undermines the rule of law do not clarify the conception of fair-
ness 24 that informs their analysis. They, instead, address more immedi-
ate consequences of the adjudication and what they consider to be the
Court's illegitimate exercise of power. 25 They consider how this deci-
sion should influence our response to future holdings, strategies to
reshape the Court,'16 and how such decisions might influence people's
perception of the Court.' 27 These scholars, then, assess the significance
the holding has for constitutional politics.
We have seen, however, that at least some critics seem to take fair-
ness more seriously.' 28 Radin, for example, clarifies how fairness fol-
lows when judges are constrained by legal principles. She accuses the
Justices of flaunting the rule of law when they limited the holding to the
facts of the case. ' 29 According to this view, the Justices sought to evade
the constraint that follows from knowing that a holding will become a
precedent. It is this constraint that encourages judges to account for
broader interests, and thus move toward the more general perspective
that characterizes legislative processes. 31 In other words, by treating
like cases alike, judges advance fairness.' 3 1
Is it surprising, therefore, that these critics do not address the ques-
tion of whether, as a consequence of Bush v. Gore, we should limit the
Court's authority to interpret the Constitution. 132  Instead, they are
123. See supra notes 76-90.
124. 1 will use the term fairness to capture these different aspirations.
125. Cf Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law Doesn't Count: The 2000 Election and the
Failure of the Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2001). Scheppele views the election in
terms of an ideal of the rule of law, but she focuses on how the judges could bring such an ideal to
bear in the cases that they adjudicate. But see Joel Edan Friedlander, The Rule of Law at
Century's End, 5 TEX. REV. L. & PoL. 317 (2001). Friedlander contends that the Bush v. Gore
holding is legitimate, because the decision itself advances rule of law values.
126. See supra note 33. See also DERSHOWlTZ, supra note 3, at 180-82.
127. See Calabresi, supra note 3, at 75-83; Balkin, supra note 3, at 222-28; Radin, supra note
3, at 125; GILLMAN, supra note 3, at 10; Klarman, supra note 12.
128. It is interesting that many of these critics compare Bush v. Gore to earlier controversial
decisions-such as Roe, Lochner, and Plessy-in order to emphasize that this holding, unlike
those, makes no pretense of being principled and is thus arbitrary.
129. See Radin, supra note 3, at 117-18.
130. See supra text accompanying note 81.
131. See Radin, supra note 3, at 118.
132. Indeed, we have seen that the legislature already has a stronger claim to authority in this
area. Consider, by contrast, statutory interpretation. In that case we would still have concern
because the legislature has great control of its agenda. Thus, it could pass statutes that advance its
interests and then interpret them to ensure that those interests are advanced. The Court, on the
other hand, has comparatively little ability to aggressively pursue its interests. Yet, considerations
of partisanship might lead us to assign the authority of interpreting statutes to electorally
accountable executives or, alternatively, to elected judges.
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attracted by future battles of constitutional politics. 33 They appeal to
fairness to challenge the authority of this Court' 34 or, alternatively, to
force the Justices to extend the principles that underlie the holding. 35
These critics adopt the perspective of adjudication, and this perspective
shapes their normative conclusions.
We can see why constitutional politics would attract scholars. We
have seen that people can influence constitutional doctrine by alleging
that judges have usurped legislative authority. As experts in constitu-
tional law, these scholars might expect that their allegations of unprinci-
pled judging would have added force. More significantly, we also have
seen that the power of judges to set the meaning of law is contingent,
that legal doctrine is often shaped by political forces that are beyond
their control. Indeed, in framing the question of why we would assign
judges authority to set the meaning of the Constitution, we assumed the
likelihood that people would challenge their interpretations. 136
Nevertheless, we must not allow a reasonable interest in the future
of constitutional doctrine to confuse our view of the normative questions
introduced by Bush v. Gore. Even if we assume that the Court used its
power unfairly and that there is reason to resist its efforts to set the
meaning of the Constitution, we still face the question of why judges
should have authority to resolve controversies based on their interpreta-
tions of law. The scholars who allege unfairness do not address this
question and actually distract attention from it. By focusing attention on
future doctrinal battles, they take it for granted that the Court will have
133. Perhaps we should attribute the allure of constitutional politics to the unique
circumstances of this case. We know that the vast majority of cases are not controversial and are
handled in a manner that seems consistent with our expectations of law. See GILLMAN, supra note
3, at 7-8; LAWRENCE BAUM, Tit- PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 65-70 (1997). Moreover,
although Supreme Court cases tend to be unique in that they present controversial questions of
doctrine, Bush v. Gore is atypical to the extent that the Justices might have had an immediate
interest in who won the case. On the other hand, Bush v. Gore is typical in that landmark cases
dominate constitutional theory, and we have seen why: constitutional politics has great allure for
constitutional theorists, given that it settles the major issues we address, including the proper
scope of judicial authority. Indeed, we have litigated this issue both directly-Marbury v.
Madison-and indirectly-cases that redefine the extent of judicial authority. Bush v. Gore
seems to be such a case.
134. See generally Radin, supra note 3; Calabresi, supra note 3; Post, supra note 108;
Rubenfeld, supra note 3. Cf DERSHOWIrz, supra note 3, at 182-84. Dershowitz proposes reforms
that respond to the problem of judicial misconduct. Id. Though his argument suggests a broader
view of the role the Court should play in our system of government, he assigns the Court a role
that depends on the decisions that the judges will make. hM. He believes that the Court serves as a
bulwark against violations of constitutional rights. Id.
135. See supra text accompanying note 37.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76. Indeed, it was the contingency of future
holdings that explained why fairness would have less significance to the question of judges'
power to set the meaning of the Constitution.
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the power in question. What is more troubling, they confuse the way
that fairness applies to the question. They assume that fairness depends
on the constraining power of principle, and seem to claim that judges
exceed their authority when legal principles do not control their deci-
sions. We, however, do not assign judges this authority because we
expect them to be constrained by legal principles.
Recall that the question of judicial authority flows from the prob-
lem of law's open texture. We assign judges the authority to clarify
vague or ambiguous legal principles, knowing that in many cases such
principles will not constrain judicial authority. Judges often can inter-
pret them to the advantage of either party to a case. We saw how well
the election controversy epitomizes this problem.
Therefore, the proper response to evidence of unfairness is to
reconsider the reasons that would lead us to assign this authority to the
Court. 3 We would assign judges this power if we thought, ex ante, that
judicial independence, legal training, professional experience, concern
for reputation, or some other factor would make them fairer than elected
institutions in resolving immediate controversies. While the Florida
election cases might lead us to question whether judges should have the
authority to interpret law, to do so because judges were not constrained
by the legal principles that should have decided the case fundamentally
misunderstands the nature of this question.
Critics such as Radin might respond that although legal principles
cannot constrain judges, judges must bind themselves by treating their
interpretations of principles as precedents. We have seen that Radin
associates the rule of law-and principled judging-with the notion of
treating like cases alike, and links the unfairness of Bush v. Gore to the
Court's attempt to deny its holding any precedential authority. 3 '
Regardless, she still fails to ask whether evidence of the Court's unfair-
ness should lead us to reconsider the reasons we assign it this authority.
Perhaps Radin believes that the holding is an anomaly, that the
Court's interest in the cases it decides will not normally lead it to avoid
establishing precedents. On the other hand, she might recognize how
easy it is for judges to evade precedents, and that precedents are made
unstable by changes in the makeup of courts and the different contexts in
137. It might be the case, however, that Bush. v. Gore is an anomaly, given the unusual stakes
of the election and that the judges had an immediate interest in the case that was tied to the parties
as opposed to a partisan concern for the shape of future doctrine. Moreover, given that their
partisan interests in the parties is tied to their interest in shaping future doctrine, it might be
appropriate to respond to a perceived abuse of power through the political checks that are relevant
to the third question.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
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which judges apply precedents.139 Each of these speculations would
explain why she would try to influence future holdings of the Justices
rather than address the question of the Court's authority. The latter
speculation suggests a significant problem. If it is true that judges will
not be bound by their own interpretations of principle and if principled
judging is essential to fairness, then fairness cannot explain why we
assign judges the authority to interpret law. This problem is beyond the
scope of this article, but we should note that Radin's focus on how to
respond to the Court's holding prevents her from giving it adequate
consideration. 140
Moreover, this focus on the future of constitutional doctrine pre-
vents Radin and other scholars from considering the institutional virtues
that might inform a definition of judicial authority, even if it were true
that judges' partisan interests prevent them from deciding cases fairly.' 4
Critics of Bush v. Gore, for example, have not considered how stability
bears on the decision to assign judges the authority to resolve controver-
sies. 14  One exception seems to be the scholars who examine the issue
of whether intervention by the Supreme Court averted a constitutional
crisis. 1 3  These scholars, however, debate the values that judges
advanced through their decision, and do not address a priori considera-
tions of stability that might explain why judges should decide cases of
this type.
There are at least two reasons why scholars would not pay adequate
attention to stability, and both follow from the tendency to view judicial
authority from the perspective of adjudication. On one hand, scholars
might assume that stability is irrelevant to the legitimacy of judicial
authority if legal principles do not constrain judges. On the other hand,
they might assume that stability is a long-term consideration that is only
relevant to the broader political process that defines constitutional
doctrine.
Like fairness, it is tempting to link stability to principled judging.
139. See generally supra note 89.
140. We should also note that both Radin and Fiss see law as a means to promote substantive
justice, and thus their work is oriented toward shaping future doctrine and not toward the problem
of how to resolve immediate controversies in light of law. See Owen Fiss, Foreword to The
Supreme Court 1978 Term: The Forms of'Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1 (2001); Margaret Jane
Radin, Reconsidering the Rule oJ" Liw, 69 B.U. L. Riv. 781 (1989).
141. It would seem, however, that fairness is a value of sufficient importance such that we
would strip the Court of its authority unless we thought that there was no institutional structure
that would decide cases fairly.
142. But see Yoo, supra note 30, at 239-40 (focusing on how people respond to the Court as
opposed to whether the Court promotes stability). He suggests that people's response to the Court
is linked to stability. Id.
143. See generally Garret, supra note 31.
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One would expect that partisan decisions would undercut stability, but
stability is a product of how people respond to the judicial decisions.
Though it is not likely that people will respect the decisions of a Court
they view as unprincipled, we should not assume that stability must fol-
low from principled decision-making.
To understand why, consider again the problem of law's open tex-
ture. We have seen that judges can interpret vague or ambiguous legal
principles to the advantage of either party to a case. Judges often decide
cases in which the political community has not clarified the principles
that would resolve the underlying controversy. Yet resolve it they must;
we would face chaos if judges-or other political institutions-allowed
controversies to fester while awaiting social consensus concerning prin-
ciples that would provide resolution. Stability is important because we
need to move past controversies, while recognizing that our differences
about principles will linger.
The political community risks instability when it resolves these
controversies.' 44 Litigants and their supporters often view their own
positions as principled and their opponents' positions as partisan. 4 5
Moreover, they lack the mastery of legal language to know whether a
holding is principled, and thus it is likely that they will resent holdings
that harm their interests.' 46 Moreover, it is not clear that greater knowl-
edge of law would reduce their suspicions. People who have the requi-
site training learn that it is often impossible to distinguish partisan from
principled positions, and that lawyers and judges are adept at masking
partisan positions in the language of principle.' 47 We therefore cannot
be certain that judges base their decisions on principle, and often must
defer to their authority, recognizing the possibility that they have used it
to advance partisan interests.
Given such circumstances, it would seem that we should measure
stability based on our expectations of how citizens will respond to the
different institutions that might resolve controversies. According to this
view, stability is best served by an institution that people respect
whether its decisions are principled or not. Stability, then, would pro-
vide reason to favor a Court that makes people think it is principled over
one that actually is principled."' Indeed, some have suggested that a
144. See Kenneth Ward, Alexander Bickel Theopy of Judicial Review Reconsidered, 28 ARIZ.
ST. L. 893, 909-14 (1996).
145. See generally Sunstein, supra note 3.
146. See generally Finn, supra note 5.
147. See generally LFIF H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASONS IN LAW (1998); see also
GILLMAN, supra note 3, at 3, 176; DERSHOWrrz, supra note 3, at 187.
148. Casey says that legitimacy entails that the Court be principled and that it be perceived as
principled. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). My analysis suggests
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partisan Court promotes stability by expanding the range of interests that
the political system represents. 149  It is plausible to think that people
would defer to the authority of a Supreme Court that has, over time,
built a reputation for representing citizens' interests. 151
This is not to say that the Court should mislead people in order to
maintain stability or better represent people's interests. Stability is just
one virtue we use to assess judicial authority, and such a Court is likely
to offend fairness, equality, integrity, reasonability, and other virtues we
associate with the rule of law. 15 1 It also seems unlikely that a Court
could maintain stability by systematically deceiving people, especially
when we consider that both politicians and scholars advance their
careers and partisan interests by exposing judicial hypocrisy. Nonethe-
less, the political community needs an institution to settle disputes in
contexts where there is no consensus about the meaning of applicable
legal principles. Stability is therefore relevant to the definition of judi-
cial authority, and that is why scholars make a mistake by assuming that
judicial authority necessarily loses legitimacy when judges fail to base
their decisions on principle.1
2
Scholars also fail to address stability because they subsume the
problem of stability within the question of the Court's authority to set
the meaning of the Constitution. 153 They consider the Court's authority
to resolve controversies in light of its role in the broader battle to define
constitutional doctrine. We have seen that judges do not have final
authority to set the meaning of the Constitution, even though they con-
trol the final disposition of particular cases; they have final authority to
interpret the law to resolve immediate controversies.' 4 Citizens,
indeed, might accept such authority, because they can challenge judges
that the perception of principled decision-making might be more important to the norm of stability
and the fact of principled judging to fairness. See also Michelman, supra note 23.
149. See, e.g., PERE-ri, supra note 8. These theorists, however, address longer-term concerns
associated with the question of why the Court should have authority to set the meaning of the
Constitution. In this article, I argue that this perspective makes it difficult to grasp the cost of
short-term instability.
150. See Kenneth Ward, Originalism and Democratic Government, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1257-
64 (2000).
151. See supra notes 76-I01.
152. See Calabresi, supra note 3, at 78-80. Indeed, Calabresi provides an example of a New
York Court of Appeals judge who introduced stability through non-principled adjudication. Id.
Though perhaps apocryphal, Calabresi's story suggests that in some circumstances judges can
address a deficiency in law that is beyond legislative correction. Id. It seems odd to view such
decisions as exceptions to legitimate authority given that one function of the Supreme Court is to
settle cases that do not lend themselves to principled resolution. See Yoo, supra note 30.
153. But see West, supra note 23.
154. Indeed, we have seen that the likelihood that citizens will challenge judges who try to
apply their interpretations o1' law to future cases is relevant to how we view the question of
judicial supremacy. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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who seek to extend the applicability of controversial interpretations of
law. This would explain why people would respect the Court, notwith-
standing their perception of partisan judging; they see the Court as inte-
gral to a political system that represents a broad range of interests.' 55
It is a mistake, however, to consider stability only in terms of the
broader question of how the political community should set the. meaning
of the Constitution. The possibility that other political institutions might
limit instability does not mean that we should ignore the costs that
would follow if we allow the wrong institution to settle our disputes.
Citizens, for example, might tolerate-and expect-partisan decisions
from the Court because they believe that the political system as a whole
adequately represents their interests in spite of the Court, and thus
ensures that constitutional doctrine ultimately reflects these interests.'56
More significantly, they will respond to holdings they reject, and in
some circumstances they will measure their response as much by the
circumstances of the original controversy as by the abstract questions of
constitutional doctrine that those circumstances implicate.
Consider recent legislation that provides the government greater
authority to investigate terrorist activities in the United States. Many
people believe that the legislation is inconsistent with the Constitution's
commitment to privacy and equality. Imagine that the Supreme Court
upholds this law and interprets it broadly in a case involving anti-abor-
tion activists. Also imagine that the decision suggests prejudice against
these groups and that their members were already predisposed to think
that the Court was hostile to their interests. They contest the decision.
Most do so through legitimate political channels, but some extremists
engage in illegal acts of violence that they direct at both governmental
institutions and private citizens. Within a few years political pressure
succeeds, and the Court reverses its judgment to the satisfaction of most
citizens.
We can see that short-term instability can damage the political
community, even if the broader political system limits the cost of this
damage. More significantly, the example suggests that sometimes we
155. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95; see also GILLMAN, supra note 3, at 5-9.
Gillman also notes that Justices face pressure to conform with people's expectations concerning
how judges base decisions on partisan considerations or on what type of partisan considerations it
is appropriate for judges to base such decisions. Id. Similarly, I have previously argued that
many people embrace the Court, notwithstanding their perception of partisan judging. See Ward,
supra note 150, at 1262. People associate the Court with what they consider to be golden ages in
which the Court defends important interests, and know that the political system provides
opportunity to challenge the Court when it fails to meet this expectation. Id.
156. Or, they might believe that the political system represents their interests well enough to
make it foolish to challenge what they consider to be illegitimate exercises of power. See
RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1999).
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can attribute instability to the immediate controversies that the Court
resolves and not to the Court's interpretation of constitutional doctrine.
It is not likely that people would have responded as they did if the Court
had made its decision in response to a different and less explosive set of
facts.
We can see the danger of short-term instability by considering Bush
v. Gore itself.157 Jack Balkin links the legitimacy of Bush v. Gore to the
broader political context of the Bush presidency. 158 He contends that
our view of the decision ultimately will be determined by the success or
failure of the Bush administration."' While this contention might be an
accurate prediction of how people will perceive the holding or of how
they will perceive the Court in the future, it ignores the role that stability
plays in defining judicial authority.
All else being equal, we would assign judges the authority to
resolve controversies such as Bush v. Gore if we thought that citizens
were more likely to accept the judges' resolution of controversies; we
seek to empower an institution that would allow us to move past such
controversies. Balkin, by contrast, considers the legitimacy of judicial
decisions-and presumably the legitimacy of the Court-based mainly
on the long-term consequences of those decisions. 6 ' He seems to view
subsequent political battles as extensions of the election controversy,
and his argument provides reason for people who believe that the Court
stole the election from Vice President Gore to undermine the Bush presi-
dency. By making our understanding of the Court's resolution of a con-
troversy-not its interpretation of law-the product of an ongoing
political controversy, Balkin invites the kind of instability we use law to
avoid. ' 6'
The academic response to Bush v. Gore illustrates how a focus on
adjudication leads scholars to ignore or confuse the significance that
fairness and stability have for the question of why we would assign
judges the authority to resolve immediate controversies. Because fair-
ness and stability are virtues that characterize political institutions, they
do not directly bear on the substantive questions that these institutions
157. Oddly enough, the problem of instability may have been alleviated by the terrorist attacks
of 2001 and the effect they have had on American citizens.
158. Balkin is concerned about the legitimacy of the decision and does not address the question
of why we allow judges to decide such cases or how the norm of stability influences our answer to
the question. I discuss Balkin because his argument suggests that we evaluate judicial authority
itself based on longer-term political battles.
159. Compare Balkin, supra note 3, at 214-18, with DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 177-78
(discussing an argument made by Judge Richard Posner, an argument that is analogous to
Balkin's).
160. See Balkin, supra note 3, at 217-18.
161. See id. at 223.
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address. 162 Therefore, scholars must look beyond adjudication in order
to grasp the significance that such virtues might have for questions of
judicial authority.
V. CONCLUSION: A PREFACE TO CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The Florida election, no doubt, is troubling. It seems very likely
that at least some judges sought to promote partisan interests and per-
haps even acted contrary to the reasons that would justify judicial
authority.163 Nevertheless, we cannot determine that this is the case
unless we have a better understanding of those reasons. To gain such an
understanding, we need to broaden our perspective of law.
The legal realist view of law distorts the problem of how one justi-
fies judicial authority. By focusing on the question of whether legal
principles control judicial decision-making, legal realists suggest that
either legal principles constrain judicial discretion or judges legislate. If
the former is true, judges can derive authority from the principles they
enforce. Otherwise, we must justify their authority based on our expec-
tations of judicial legislation. We have seen, however, that this mis-
states the problem of justifying judicial authority. As Florida
demonstrates, judges cannot derive authority from the legal principles
they enforce because those principles do not have a determinate meaning
until judges interpret them. Law's open texture necessitates authority to
supplement vague or ambiguous legal principles; it requires executive or
judicial legislation. The question, then, is not whether judges legislate,
but whether we have reason to assign this authority to judges.
More significantly, the legal realist view obscures potential justifi-
cations of judicial authority that follow from a broader view of law. The
conclusion that legal principles do not control judicial discretion leads
theorists to collapse the distinction between law and politics; judges, like
ordinary legislators, pursue preferences. This invites the assumption
that law is not relevant to the justification of judicial authority. Yet we
have seen that the institutional virtues that characterize the rule of law
bear on questions of judicial authority, whether or not legal principles
constrain judicial decisions.
This article has sought to bring attention to the role that institu-
162. We have seen, however, that there are sometimes cognate values that directly bear on the
outcome of adjudication. Indeed, the values of fairness and stability were relevant to these cases.
My point is that while such values matter to the adjudication, it is as virtues of the rule of law that
they inform a definition of judicial authority.
163. This charge has been brought against judges on both sides of the controversy, but
resolving the particular charges is well beyond the scope of this paper. Theresa H. Hammond,
Judicial Jabberwocky in the Presidential Election 2000: When Low and Facts Collide with
Politics, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1567 (2001). But see GILLMAN, supra note 3; Tribe, supra note 3.
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tional virtues might play in the justification of judicial authority, virtues
we find outside of the context of adjudication. Its argument is signifi-
cant given that theorists tend to evaluate judicial authority based on how
they expect judges to decide landmark cases. Nonetheless, we have
established only a foundation on which theorists might justify judicial
authority. Indeed, we have only identified three virtues that are relevant
to the question, and provided a sketch of how they might contribute to
such a justification. In addition, this article suggests new issues that a
persuasive justification of judicial authority must address. I will con-
clude the article by bringing these interesting issues to the foreground.
The institutional virtues that I have associated with the rule of law
are political. They therefore contribute to a political justification of judi-
cial authority.' 64 But what does it mean for the rule of law to contribute
to a political justification of judicial authority? The theorists I discuss in
Section III(C)(ii) are illustrative. They define judicial authority based
on political considerations that follow from the reasons that people gov-
ern themselves by law; they believe that the political structure should
manifest institutional virtues.' 65 By contrast, we have seen that many
scholars view judicial authority as a purely political institution and
ignore such virtues.' 66 They accept the legal realist assumption that
principles will not constrain judicial decision-making, and then consider
the values that judges might advance.' 6 7
We might also compare those who associate judicial authority with
institutional virtues to related theorists who view judicial authority in
strictly legal terms. This comparison is of limited utility though,
because at some level, the distinction between law and politics col-
lapses.'6 Although some theorists might still consider law and politics
autonomous realms, 169 no one could reasonably deny that there are polit-
ical consequences that follow from the decision to use a system of law to
resolve disputes among citizens. Therefore, the decision to establish a
legal system is political, and considerations of politics dictate the struc-
ture of such a system.
Rather than debate the extent that law is political, we could distin-
164. See supra text accompanying notes 76-100.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 60-72.
166. Note how the legal realist view reverses my characterization of the relationship between
law and judicial authority. It considers law as a product ofjudges and thus focuses on what judges
do. Consequently, legal realists pay much less attention to how the reasons that favor the rule of
law bear on a conception of judicial authority.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
168. See GILLMAN, supra note 3, at 6.
169. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALU- L. 509 (1998) (suggesting that law is
autonomous to the extent that it serves political purposes associated with rule based decision-
making).
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guish these theories based on how they assess the constraining force of
legal principles. Some theorists, for example, believe that partisan judg-
ing is not consistent with the rule of law. These theorists consequently
define a conception of judicial authority that limits the cases that judges
can decide, 7 ' or defend a theory of interpretation that explains how
legal principles might constrain judicial decisions.' 7 '
While we might call such theories legalistic, it is unclear what is
gained by using that term. Given law's open texture, any theory that
assigns judges authority to interpret law must anticipate some likelihood
of partisan judging. There will always be circumstances in which judges
can interpret legal principles to the advantage of either party and not
face any serious ramifications. 72 The more interesting issue involves
the tension between partisan judging and the virtues that characterize the
rule of law: to what extent is the rule of law consistent with discretion-
ary judicial authority?
We have seen that institutional virtues are independent of the par-
ticular cases that judges decide. 73 Further, it is plausible that some vir-
tues could be advanced even if judges often based decisions on partisan
considerations. Macedo, for example, links judicial authority to the vir-
tue of reasonability. Partisan judges could satisfy Macedo's conception
of judging so long as they expressed the interests they favor in terms of
principles that were applicable to the cases that they decided. 74 On the
other hand, it would seem that a political system would be unfair if
judges systematically engaged in partisanship. Evidence of such judging
would provide ample reason to rethink the considerations of fairness that
might lead us to assign judges such authority.
Therefore, we must weigh the dangers of judicial partisanship
against what we expect judges to contribute to a system of politics. This
suggests yet another issue: how to resolve tension that arises among the
different roles that we expect judges to play. In this article, we have
considered institutional virtues that might inform a definition of judicial
authority. This, however, is not to deny that judges might also contrib-
ute to the political community by making decisions that represent certain
interests' 75 or advance good values,'76 or by participating in the process
170. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 8; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional law, 73 HARV. L. RFv. 1 (1959); James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 17 (1893).
171. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 8; wInTrrINTON, supra note 8; BORK, supra note 55.
172. See Ward, supra note 150, at 1261-63.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 76-100.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
175. See, e.g., PERE-ri, supra note 8.
176. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 8; EISGRUBER, supra note 8.
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that defines such values. 77
Moreover, we have seen that theorists have identified a variety of
virtues that characterize the rule of law, and that these virtues apply
differently to the different questions of judicial authority.' 78 It seems
likely, therefore, that the reasons that might lead us to expand judicial
authority in one area would lead us to restrict it in another. We might,
for example, assign judges the authority to resolve particular controver-
sies based on considerations of fairness and stability. We might think
that the Court will not have an immediate interest in the overwhelming
majority of cases they decide-Bush v. Gore would be an anomaly-
and that citizens are more likely to embrace its decisions because they
view the Court as a legal more than a political institution.'
79
Note, though, these same considerations would suggest that we
should limit the Court's authority to set the meaning of the Constitution.
Recall that fairness is associated with the separation of powers; we
divide power among the Legislature, Judiciary, and Executive to ensure
that law is written at a level of generality that reduces the chances of
self-interested or biased legislation. 8° While we empower judges to
determine how general rules should apply to the circumstances of partic-
ular cases, to maintain fairness we must limit the influence that those
circumstances have on the definition of these rules. Thus, we risk losing
the benefits of general legislation by expanding judicial authority to set
the meaning of the Constitution.' 8 '
In addition, while it would promote stability if citizens accepted
judicial decisions because they associate the Court with law, the same
consideration should give us pause in extending the Court's authority to
set the meaning of the Constitution. We allow judges a share of this
authority because we can challenge the interpretations that they favor;
the meaning of the Constitution remains an open political question.
8 2
Nonetheless, if citizens are more likely to be persuaded by what they
perceive to be the legal authority of judicial interpretations, then judges
gain an added advantage in the political battle over constitutional mean-
ing. People who believe that questions of constitutional meaning are
political questions and that judges have no special expertise that bears
177. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 7; SUNSTEIN, supra note 8; Michelman, supra note 8.
178. See supra text accompanying note 68.
179. This would explain why people tend to view the Court more favorably than elected
institutions even though they seem to have very little knowledge about the Justices and most of'
their decisions. See Yoo, supra note 30, at 225-26, 229; see also Ward, supra note 150.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
181. There are, of course, other considerations that would lead people to expand such
authority, and some scholars have even argued that we would benefit if law were more responsive
to particular contexts. See, e.g., CATIItRINI- MACKINNON, ONLY WORS (1993).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
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on such questions would then have reason to curtail judicial authority to
set the meaning of the Constitution. They should seriously consider
reforms that would allow Congress to overturn judicial interpretations
through a statute or a resolution. 83
By broadening our perspective of law, we introduce important con-
siderations and complications for theorists who seek to justify judicial
authority. We solidify the foundation on which to begin such a justifica-
tion. But justification is a task best reserved for a different article.
183. See BORK, supra note 8, at 96-119; TUSHNET, supra note 8. But this authority should only
extend to the future application of judicial interpretations. We have already seen that the authority
to resolve particular controversies presents a different question.
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